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I. INTRODUCTION
What is a human life worth? The obvious answer, echoed in
literature throughout the ages,' is that life is priceless. Ask peo-
ple how much money they would demand to surrender their lives
and the replies would be predictable and uniform. No amount
would suffice.
In practical application, this view of life as priceless is reflect-
ed in the monumental efforts society is willing to undertake to
save identifiable persons from immediate peril. Without hesita-
tion, we marshal all available resources to save the coal miners
trapped in a collapsed mine shaft or the shipwreck survivors lost
at sea. Consider the paradigmatic plight of Jessica McClure, the
little girl who became trapped in the Texas water well in 1987.
Extraordinary rescue efforts were undertaken to rescue her, at
great cost.2 It is doubtful, however, that anyone was overheard
suggesting that Jessica be left to die because the attempts to res-
cue her were too costly. In that situation, society deemed Jessica's
life to be priceless.3
1 "So precious life is! Even to the old/The hours are as a miser's coins . " T.
ALDRICH, Broken Musi, 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS BAILEY ALDRICH 90 (1907)
(Ponkapog ed.); "There's no Wealth but life." J. RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST § 77 (1979);
"Someone will give away all he has to save his life." Job 2:4 (New Jerusalem); "The loss
of honest and industrious men's lives cannot be valued at any price." Angel, Federal
Court OKs "Hedonic" Damages for Death of Boy, LA. Daily J., Sept. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 2
(quoting William Bradford writing about the losses suffered during the crossing of the
Mayflower).
2 No cost figures for the rescue are available, but it took 400 workers with heavy
equipment 58 hours to drill a parallel shaft through hard rock to extricate Jessica. For
an account of the rescue, see Applebome, Toddler Is Rescued After 2 1/2 Days in a Texas
Weg N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
3 Where the issue becomes one of saving some number of abstract lives in the
future, rather than an immediate decision to save a known name and face, the sky is no
longer the limit. Suppose, for example, that in the wake of the Jessica McClure incident
the United States Department of Agriculture begins considering whether to require
farmers to install grates on top of all water wells. If society truly believes life is price-
less, the economic burden of requiring the grates should be irrelevant. But, of course,
the burden is not irrelevant. In a world of finite resources, rational decisions have to be
made regarding how those resources should be distributed.
This is reflected quite dramatically in the way the federal government decides
whether to impose safety regulations on industries. Under a 1981 Reagan Administration
executive order, federal agencies are required to weigh the cost of implementing any
new safety regulation against the benefits to be derived in terms of the number of
deaths the regulation can be expected to prevent. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988). To accomplish this, agencies are required to
place a value on human life. The result in many instances is that life becomes less
precious. Federal agency cost-benefit analysis has resulted in the value of a human life
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Suppose, however, that Jessica McClure had died and that
her death was attributable to some act of negligence by a party
with the wherewithal to pay a tort judgment. No longer would
her life be viewed as priceless. To the contrary, a wrongful death
suit brought by Jessica's survivors historically would result in a
judicial determination that Jessica's life had little or no worth.
This is because the traditional standard for measuring damages in
wrongful death actions is the pecuniary loss rule, which looks at
the monetary value of benefits the decedent could have been
expected to contribute to his4 survivors had he lived. For a child,
this is usually calculated by determining the pecuniary benefits the
child would have contributed to the family minus the costs of
being placed as low as $70,000. Lavelle, Placing a Price on Human Life, Nat'i Uj., Oct.
10, 1988, at 28, col. 2 ($70,000 value assigned by Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion).
The reason for distinguishing between preventing the loss of statistical lives and
rescuing identifiable persons is complex. Charles Fried, in a thoughtful 1969 article,
discussed the economic perspective that immediate peril should be put on an exact
parity with statistical peril for purposes of investing in life saving. Fried, The Value of
Life, 82 HARV. L REV. 1415 (1969). Rational' economic decisions dictate that society
should undertake individual rescue efforts only where consistent with the theory of
maximizing society's welfare. Resources should not be spent on rescuing one life if
doing so takes away resources which could be used to prevent the loss of a greater
number'of lives. Fried asserts that society's preference for rescuing persons in immediate
peril can be harmonized with this maximizing strategy in most situations. Id. at 1419.
However, he recognizes that this preference persists even where the rescue is contrary to
welfare maximization. Id. at 1428.
One plausible explanation for this is what Fried calls the "personalist argument,"
which "holds that some preference for known over statistical lives is justified because it
is with known lives that we enter into relations of love and friendship, while to the
abstract statistical lives we stand in relations defined by justice and fairness." I& at 1428-
29. The fairness dictate of maximizing society's welfare becomes overshadowed when we
are dealing with persons with whom we have concrete, emotional contacts. Fried's other
explanation is that the circumstance of facing certain, imminent death is a special kind
of suffering, one that is appropriate for society to consider in its allocation of resources.
Id. at 143&37.
Media accounts of life and death struggles extend the impact of this phenomenon
considerably. Where we lack the personal relation of love and friendship with the victim,
the media nevertheless allows us, indeed commands us, to become vicarious mothers and
fathers to suffering victims everywhere. They do not even have to be human. Consider
the recent whale rescue off the coast of Barrow, Alaska. Thousands of whales are slaugh-
tered each year for commercial purposes, generating the ire of only a small segment of
environmentally minded people. Nevertheless, a Cable News Network call-in survey
showed that 89 percent of the 7,500 respondents believed the whale rescue effort was
worth the one million dollar cost. Stanfield, Nature's Ways Nat'i J. Inc., Nov. 12, 1988,
at 2912.
4 When practicable, gender-neutral language is used throughout this article. Occa-
sionally, however, it is necessary to use single-sex pronouns such as "his" and "her."
Such pronouns are intended to be generic.
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raising the child.5 Since child-raising costs usually far outdistance
pecuniary benefits bestowed by a child, the result is that children
usually have a negative net worth.6
Under the pecuniary loss rule, followed in almost every state,
life has no intrinsic value-no value per se. This seems to be a
peculiar result in a society that refuses, at least for some purpos-
es, to place any price tag on human life. Of course, an obvious
distinction can be drawn between the cost of saving a life not yet
lost and allowing tort recovery for one that is gone. Since no
amount of money can bring the decedent back, she cannot be
compensated in any meaningful way for the loss of her life.7
However, while this may justify a difference in the monetary val-
ues society attaches to lives that can be saved and those already
lost, it does not support the traditional legal notion that a lost life
has no cognizable value apart from the lost economic benefits the
decedent would have conferred upon her survivors.
The primary thesis of this Article is that life does have an
independent value. There is value to working at one's chosen
occupation, to loving, to laughing, to walking on the beach, to
watching the sun set. Part II defends the thesis that recovery for
this value, popularly known as "hedonic damages,"' should be
recognized9 as an element of damages in wrongful death act-
5 See generally 3 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD & R. GOLDSTEIN,
DAMAGES IN TORT AcTIONS § 24.00 (1988) [hereinafter MINZER]. Some jurisdictions have
alleviated the harshness of the pecuniary loss rule in child death cases by extending the
concept of pecuniary loss to include loss of companionship and society (see infra note
32) or by expressly recognizing non-economic damages for such losses. See generally id. at
§ 24.20.
6 "To limit damages for the death of a child to the monetary value of the services
which the next of kin could reasonably have expected to receive during his minority less
the reasonable expense of maintaining and educating him stamps almost all modern
children as worthless in the eyes of the law. In fact, if the rule was literally followed,
the average child would have a negative worth." Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275,
279, 207 N.W.2d 686, 688-89 (1973).
7 For a discussion, of how money damages for the lost value of life relate to the
compensatory function of tort law, see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
8 "Hedonic damages" is the term commonly used to describe the damages which
are the subject of this article. While that label is used occasionally herein, the author
prefers the terms "value of lost life,' "lost life damages," or "damages for the intrinsic
value of life," since they avoid the possible negative association of hedonic damages with
"hedonism," the Epicurean philosophy that pleasure is the sole good in life.
9 This article is about the relatively new concept of awarding damages for the
value of lost life where a tortfeasor's conduct has caused the death of the tort victim.
This concept is distinct from the more firmly established practice of allowing damages
for non-fatal injuries that infringe upon plaintiffs ability to participate in the amenities
of life. The latter are usually referred to as damages for the "lost enjoyment of life." See
genery MINZER, supra note 5, at §§ 8.00-8.39 (1989); Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of
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ions.1 0 Part HIl discusses the extent to which such recoveries are
or may be recognized under current law. Part IV evaluates how
the value of lost life should be determined. Part V, the conclu-
sion, briefly summarizes the Article.
II. RECOGNIZING THE VALUE OF LOST LIFE
A. The Perverse Pecuniary Loss Rule
Given the general maxim that tort victims are entitled to
recover damages for all injuries caused by a tortfeasor,n oppo-
Life-Dupllcation of Damages Venus Full Compensation, 63 N.D.L REV. 561 (1987); Note,
Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAC. LJ. 965 (1981); Anno-
tation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding Damages for
Bodily Inury, 34 A.LR. 4th 293 (1984).
Lost enjoyment of life damages in non-death cases are limited only by the range of
human activities. See, e.g., Wells v. Colorado College, 478 F.2d 158, 160-62 (10th Cir.
1973) (skiing); Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1973) (loss of ability
to enjoy sex); Titus v. Smith, 330 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (painting); Frankel
v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (inability to engage in normal
family activities), affd 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Gowdy v. United States, 271 F.
Supp. 733, 751 (W.D. Mich. 1967) (reading), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th
Cir. 1969); Wry v. Dial, 18 Ariz. App. 503, 506, 503 P.2d 979, 982 (1972) (hiking); Fruit
v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 145 (Alaska 1972) (hunting, fishing); Packard v. Whitten, 274
A.2d 169, 177 (Me. 1971) (dancing); Bailey v. Bradford, 247 Ark. 1048, 1049, 449
S.W.2d 180 (1970) (cheerleading); Scally v. W.T. Garratt & Co., 11 Cal. App. 138, 142,
104 P. 325, 327 (1909) (inability to pursue musical studies); Powell v. Hegney, 239 So.
2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (swimming, bowling); Collier v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 225 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (horseback riding); Conchola v. Kraft, 575
S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. CL App. 1978) (basketball).
Most jurisdictions permit such damages, but disagree as to whether they should be
awarded only as a component of damages for pain and suffering or permanent impair-
ment, or whether they constitute an independent element of damages. Compare Poyzer v.
McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (separate awards for lost enjoyment of life
and pain and suffering are duplicative) and Blodgett v. Olympic Say. & Loan Ass'n, 32
Wash. App. 116, 125, 646 P.2d 139, 146 (1982) (error to give separate jury instruction
on lost enjoyment of life damages) and Huff v. Tracy, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 944, 129
Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1976) (loss of enjoyment of life, not a separate element of damages)
with Thompson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980) (pain
and suffering, permanent impairment, and lost enjoyment of life are separate elements
of damages) and Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980) (allowing lost enjoy-
ment of life as a separate element of damages) and Swiler v. Baker's Super Mkt., Inc.,
203 Neb. 183, 187-88, 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1979) (upholding jury instruction treating
lost enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages).
10 In addition to wrongftl death statutes, most states have survival statutes, which
provide for the continuation of claims the decedent would have been able to bring had
he lived. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of why survival
statutes do not constitute an appropriate vehicle for recovering damages for the value of
lost life.
11 "One injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from the
other for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused by the tort." RESTATE-
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nents of damages for the value of lost life logically should bear
the burden of establishing why such damages are improper. The
historical development of wrongful death law, however, weighs
heavily against the award of lost life damages.
At common law, death actions were not recognized at all,
stemming from Lord Ellenborough's infamous dictum in Baker v.
Bolton 2 that "[i]n a civil court, the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury.""s Lord Ellenborough
offered neither reasoning nor authority for this pronouncement;
according to Professor Malone, it lacked historical support at the
time.'4 Nevertheless, the dictum "became a magical intoned in-
cantation recited by rote, without any critical examination, by
hundreds of decisions in the various courts throughout the length
and breadth of the United States."' 5
In 1846, the English Parliament passed what became known
as Lord Campbell's Act,'6 which created a right of action for
wrongful death on behalf of the decedent's immediate family. The
adoption of Lord Campbell's Act in America was as sweeping as
the earlier transformation of the law wrought by Baker v.
Bolton. 7 All American states adopted the Act in some form.
Lord Campbell's Act broadly empowered juries to award survivors
"such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury,"18
yet courts in both England and America interpreted it to autho-
rize recovery of the survivors' pecuniary losses only.19
This is the law in America today. Most jurisdictions, often
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1979).
12 1 Campbell 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
13 Id.
14 Malone, The Genesis of Wronglul Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (1965).
15 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.1 (2d ed. 1975). The felony-
merger doctrine is the explanation most commonly offered for the rule. According to
this doctrine, when an act constituted both a tort and a felony, recovery was not al-
lowed for the tort because it was deemed less important than the offense against the
Crown. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970). American courts
picked up and followed Lord Ellenborough's pronouncement despite the fact that the
felony-merger doctrine never applied to bar civil suits in this country. Id.
16 Fatal Accident Act, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846) [hereinafter Lord Campbell's Act].
17 1 S. SPEIsER, supra note 15, at § 1:9.
18 Lord Campbell's Act, supra note 16.
19 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 15, at § 3:1. American courts rejected the notion that
life has an intrinsic value apart from economic productivity. See, e.g., Chase v. Fitzgerald,
132 Conn. 461, 467-68, 45 A.2d 789, 792 (1946) ("As regards death, damages for it




pursuant to express statutory provisions, ° follow the "loss-to-the-
survivors" rule, according to which damages in wrongful death
actions are limited to the pecuniary loss sustained by the
decedent's beneficiaries.21 "Pecuniary loss" generally means the
financial contributions the decedent would have been expected to
make to his beneficiaries had he lived, calculated as the present
value of the victim's expected earnings minus hii personal con-
sumption expenses.2
2
As a practical matter, however, the pecuniary loss rule
equates the value of life with the amount of money or services
the decedent would have contributed to his family.23 The pecuni-
ary loss rule corresponds relatively well with the idea of compen-
sating the survivors for their losses when combined with damages
for the survivors' loss of society and companionship (which most
states now recognize 24) and/or mental anguish (which some
states recognize ). But the rule fails to account for the value of
the decedent's life in its own right. While supporting one's family
is an important social and moral obligation, few would consider
their success in fulfilling that responsibility to be the sole determi-
nant of their worth. As a result, existing damage rules in
wrongful death actions undervalue human life. As lamented by
William Landes and Richard Posner:
20 See infra note 174.
21 A minority of states follow the "loss-to-the-estate" rule, which also measures
damages by pecuniary losses, but focuses upon losses suffered by the decedent's estate
as a result of his premature death, rather than losses suffered directly by the s6rvivors.
The results, in many cases, are similar. See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text for
discussion of the loss-to-the-estate jurisdictions.
22 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, L KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 127, 949-50 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON]. In most jurisdictions,
pecuniary losses also include the value of services the decedent would have rendered to
the beneficiaries. I& at 951.
23 Nowhere has this ugly rule been stated more starkly than in Gannon v. Lawler,
34 Pa. D. & C. 571, 581 (1939), where the court said:
Decedent's life is of value to his creditors, at least, but the only measure of the
monetary value of a human life is what the life would have produced in money
if it had not terminated in death ... . In our opinion, damages for the eco-
nomic value of a life and for loss of earning power are the same.
24 See cases and statutes collected in MINZER, supra note 5, § 22.43(1)(a). The law
of wrongful death varies tremendously from state to state. It is not the purp6se of this
Article to catalog the different rules of each state. Accordingly, when discussing general
wrongful death principles, the reader will be referred to authoritative treatises on the
subject, rather than to cases and statutes of individual states.
25 An increasing number of states, though still a minority, allow survivors to recover
for mental anguish caused by the death. See id. at § 22.32.
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The limitation of damages to survivors' pecuniary loss is
very peculiar. It implicitly assumes-if, as we generally believe
to be the case, tort law seeks to internalize the costs of acci-
dents-that the average person derives no utility from living.
He does not work for himself, he works solely for his family.
This cannot be right, and it results in a systematic underesti-
mation of damages in wrongful-death cases. 6
The unfairness of the pecuniary loss rule in underestimating
wrongful death damages is demonstrated most acutely in classes
of cases involving decedents who are not expected to make any
substantial pecuniary contributions to their survivors. Application
of the pecuniary loss' rule in death cases involving minor children,
as noted,2" traditionally resulted in a determination that a child's
life has a negative net worth. Similarly, the lives of adult children
caught in the window of life between emancipation and the cre-
ation of their own families have little value under the pecuniary
loss rule because their death causes no one to experience a signif-
icant economic loss. An adult child has no legal obligation to
contribute to the support of her parents," and, until she has
married, has acquired no dependents of her own.29 At the other
end of life's continuum, elderly people have already used up most
of their economic productivity. Consequently, their lives may not
be worth much in pecuniary terms. Finally, and perhaps most sig-
nificantly, the pecuniary loss rule promotes a kind of caste system
by branding entire classes of no- or low-wage earners in our soci-
ety as worth less than their wealthier counterparts. Is a lawyer's
life really worth several times more than that of his secretary's? A
doctor's more than her nurse's? Broader comparisons have even
worse implications for society. Whites earn significantly more than
blacks."0 Are their lives worth more? The pecuniary loss rule
26 W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT LAW 187 (1987).
27 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
28 Gilbert v. Root, 294 N.W.2d 431, 433 (S.D. 1980). Parents are not precluded
from attempting to prove that, even though the child was emancipated, they had a
reasonable expectation of receiving economic benefits in the form of either money or
services. See, e.g., Halvorsen v. Dunlap, 495 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1974) (testimony that
decedent had planned to return to Norway upon completing his education and develop
parents' farm into a resort); Weast v. Festus Flying Serv., Inc., 680 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (evidence showed plaintiff's married adult child had assisted family in a
variety of ways, including rendering nursing services to disabled grandmother).
29 This is just one aspect of the broader rule that, unless a decedent leaves behind
dependent survivors, there can be no recovery for wrongful death. Webster v. Norwegian
Min. Co., 137 Cal. 399, 70 P. 276 (1902); VanderWegen v. Great N. Ry. Co., 114 Minn.
118, 119-22, 130 N.W. 70, 70-71 (1911) (applying Montana law).
30 According to the 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, the 1988
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would say "yes." The same holds true as to the comparative value
of men versus women-men earn more.3'
In some of these problem cases judges2 and juries"3 have
found ways to avoid the harshness of the pecuniary loss rule and
allowed substantial damages, but this fact in no way supports the
soundness of the rule. To the contrary, it shows that some of the
decision-makers in our tort system appreciate that the pecuniary
median yearly income for white men employed full-time was $28,262, while it was only
$20,716 for black men. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISiCAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNrrED
STATES 453 (1990). Moreover, the 1988 unemployment rate for whites was 4.7 percent,
compared to 11.7 percent for blacks. Id. at 380.
31 The 1988 median yearly income for males was $27,342, compared to only
$18,545 for females. Id. at 453.
32 A classic example of how judges have reacted to the rigidity of the pecuniary
loss rule is Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960), a wrongful death
action involving the death of a fourteen-year-old boy. A jury awarded the plaintiff
$15,000, but the trial judge ordered a remittitur to half that amount reasoning that the
death of a fourteen-year-old could not constitute a $15,000 pecuniary loss to his parents.
The Supreme Court of Michigap castigated the "barbarous concept" that the child-labor
measure of damages under the pecuniary loss rule should be used to measure the loss
suffered by parents from the death of a child. The court's solution was to redefine the
"pecuniary value" of a life to include "the value of mutual society and protection, in a
word, companionship." Id. at 339-40, 105 N.W.2d at 121-22. See also Green v. Bittner, 85
NJ. 1, 2, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980) (in response to the jury's finding that the life of a
high school senior was "worthless to others, in a pecuniary sense," the court rejected
pecuniary loss limitation and held that damages for parents' loss of a child includes
damages for loss of companionship); Anderson v. Lale, 88 S.D. 111, 121, 216 N.W.2d
152, 158 (1974) (stating that any court allowing more than nominal damages for death
of a minor "must have tacitly accepted" recovery for loss of companionship because
under the pecuniary loss rule, "except in rare cases, never would a child's earnings be
more than his cost of upbringing"). For general discussion of Wycko and the legal fic-
tions designed to avoid the harshness of the pecuniary loss rule in child death cases, see
Johnson, Wrongful Death and Intelletual Dishonesty, 16 S.D.L REV. 36 (1971). Today, most
jurisdictions allow recovery for the loss of a child's society and companionship or for
mental anguish suffered as a result of a child's death, making possible the recovery of
substantial damages in many cases. See cases and statutes collected in F. HARPER, F.
JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.14 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER].
33 See Gonzales v. Union Carbide Corp., 580 F. Supp. 249, 253-54 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(upholding $3 million compensatory award for death of truck driver, although plaintiffs
expert estimated present value of lost earnings to be only $1.5 million); Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Lueck, 111 Ariz. 560, 576, 535 P.2d 599, 610 (1975) (upholding jury
award of $2 million in compensatory damages to survivors of 30-year-old man even
though decedent had never earned more than $6,000 in any one year and economist
testified that the present value of the pecuniary loss to his beneficiaries was $281,863),
ceil. denied, 425 U.S. 913 (1976); Fedt v. Oak Lawn Lodge, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1072,
478 N.E.2d 469, 478 (II. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding $1 million award for death of
window washer, noting: "There is no fixed monetary standard for evaluating a human
life, and the award of damages greatly depends on the sound judgment of the jury.");
Monsanto Co. v. Johnson, 675 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
$710,000 award for pecuniary loss and loss of consortium for death of 63-year-old man,
relying upon jury's discretion).
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loss rule fails to accurately account for all the losses inflicted by
wrongful death. No one, not even defense lawyers or insurance
company executives, would argue that life is without value apart
from economic productivity. Rather, the arguments against hedon-
ic damages implicitly assume the following concessionary form:
"Even granting that life has intrinsic value, damages for the value of
lost life should be disallowed because . . . ," followed by objec-
tions. This undeniable conclusion-that life has value not recog-
nized under existing wrongful death remedies-should stack the
deck against the objectors to damages for lost life.
B. Refuting the Arguments, Against Damages for the Value of Lost Life
The arguments against damages for the value of lost life are
twofold: (1) awarding such damages does not fulfill the compensa-
tory function of tort law; and (2) valuing life is too speculative to
form a basis for computing damages. Neither of these arguments
justifies denying recovery for lost life.
1. The "Inability to Make Whole" Argument.
"The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is
that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by
defendant's breach of duty." 4 This compensatory function of
tort law finds more specific expression in the "make whole" prin-
ciple, according to which the object of tort damages is to restore
the tort victim as nearly as possible to the position he would have
been in had the injury not occurred."5 The "make whole" princi-
ple furnishes a ready and seemingly completely logical refutation
of the notion that damages should be awarded for the value of
lost life. A dead person cannot be compensated for his lost life. A
trillion dollars would contribute nothing toward making him
whole again. Restoration in this setting is simply beyond the ca-
pacity of the tort system. 6
34 HARPER, supra note 32, § 25.1, at 490 (emphasis in original).
35 Id- See generally ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS
A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-29 to 4-32 (1984) [hereinafter TOWARDS A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF INJURY].
36 In one of the few state cases to address the issue of lost life damages, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania rejected them as "contrary to the compensatory objective
of awarding damages to tort victims." Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Center, 482 Pa.
441, 446, 393 A.2d 1188, 1190 (1978). See also Barrett, Price of Pleasure: New Legal Theo-
rists Attach a Dollar Value To the Joys of Living, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1988, at A-4, col. 3
(Ohio attorney Neil F. Freund, asking- "Why should there be any separate award for lost
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But this facile argument ignores the fact that the American
tort system relies upon money damages to compensate several
types of intangible injuries which are not translatable into dollars
and cents. Money in no way, for example, eases physical pain and
mental suffering. A bountiful award for pain and suffering may
enable the quadriplegic to motor around a new mansion in a ster-
ling silver wheelchair,"' but it does not reduce'the suffering he
encounters each time he attempts to perform any of the myriad
tasks of daily life the rest of us take for granted, Hedonic damag-
es may not restore the dead, but neither do pain and suffering
damages restore feeling and movement to the quadriplegic's body.
The predictable response to this is that, while damages for
intangible physical and mental injuries cannot make injured per-
sons whole, they do presumably provide some solace and perhaps
even a degree of happiness to the victim. To the contrary, the
dead get no benefit at all from money damages for their lost life.
Even assuming that lesser degrees of doctrinal fiction have more
virtue than greater degrees of the same fiction, this response
would not account for damage awards in survival actions for the
decedent's conscious pain and suffering prior to death. A majority
of states allow the decedent's estate to recover damages for the
pain and suffering experienced by the decedent between the time
of injury and time of death, yet such damages obviously serve no
compensatory function."8 The fact that they are awarded for pain
and suffering actually experienced by the decedent, 9 whereas
the decedent does not consciously experience any loss from death
itself,4" does nothing to enhance their compensatory effect.
41
pleasure to someone who is already dead?"); Tapp, Lawyers Pushing for an Expansion of
'Hedonic' Damages, Chicago Daily L Bull., Aug. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (Illinois attorney
William W. Kurnik, stating: "It's not rational. You cannot compensate a person who is
dead.").
37 Cf. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977) ("[M]onetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain
the companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that
upon reaching adulthood... they will be unusually wealthy men and women."). In
truth, pain and suffering awards probably serve more to finance the American contingen-
cy fee system, rather than to pad the pockets of tort victims.
38 See cases collected in MINZER, supra note 5, at § 21.11.
39 Damages are available only where evidence shows the decedent consciously
experienced pain and suffering. See, e.g., Complaint of Farrell Lines, Inc., 389 F. Supp.
194, 205 (D. Ga. 1975) (insufficient evidence regarding conscious pain and suffering of
children who drowned); Searcy v. Porter, 381 So. 2d 540, 544 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
($8,000 adequate for deceased child's pain and suffering where record showed child was
only semi-conscious for one-and-one-half hours following accident and comatose for the
remaining period prior to death).
40 An injured person whose prognosis is death may, of course, experience great
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2. The "Too Speculative" Argument.
Related to the argument that hedonic damages fail to serve
the compensatory function of tort law is the objection that such
damages are too speculative because no meaningful formula exists
for valuing human life. 2 As with the "failure to make whole"
argument, this argument sweeps too broadly. Valuing life surely is
a speculative venture, but so is the task of valuing other intangi-
ble injuries such as pain and suffering, loss of consortium and
mental distress. These are no more susceptible to accurate mea-
surement than the value of life.
The only standardized method yet developed for computing
pain and suffering damages is the per diem approach by which
plaintiffs counsel asks the jury to multiply the period of time
during which plaintiff can be expected to experience the pain and
suffering (broken down into seconds, minutes, hours, days,
months or years) by an economic value assigned for each unit of
time. The product is the suggested pain and suffering award.4"
While the conclusion is reached by a mathematical process, it is
completely arbitrary because of the lack of any method for deter-
mining the all important value assigned to the pain and suffering
experienced during each time unit.
suffering because of this prospect, which may be compensable as one aspect of pre-death
pain and suffering. See, e.g., Juiditta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 75 A.D.2d 126, 138, 428
N.Y.S.2d 535, 543 (1980) (apprehension of impending death is among the elements to
be considered in assessing damages for conscious pain and suffering during the period
between injury and death).
41 Damages for conscious pain and suffering preceding death have been criticized
on the same basis as damages for the value of lost life. Livingston, Survival of Tort
Actions: A Proposal for California Legislation, 37 CAuF. L REv. 63, 74 (1949) ("The de-
ceased bore the pain and suffering and he is the only one who should be compensated.
He can't take it with him.")
42 Blum, More. Suing Over Lost Joy of Lifre, Nat'l L J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 24, col. 3
(Virginia defense attorney James Morris, III, characterizing hedonic damages as offensive
because "[you can never put a price on a person for what they gave up. It can't be
evaluated."); Barrett, supra note 36, at A-4, col. 3 (Illinois defense attorney William W.
Kurnik lamenting that "life is particular to every person: what it's worth to smell a rose
or eat a steak.").
43 See generally Werchick, Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS LJ.
263, 273-85 (1965). Taking a simplified example, suppose the evidence showed the
quadriplegic plaintiff had a life expectancy of forty more years. It is not difficult to
convince a jury that a quadriplegic's suffering is worth at least 10 cents per minute.
Multiplying that amount by the number of minutes in a 16 hour day (since the plaintiff
is not entitled to pain and suffering damages during the hours he is asleep), multiplied




In the most notable rejection of per diem arguments, the New
Jersey Supreme Court exposed the speculative nature of comput-
ing money damages for pain and suffering awards:
[P]ain and suffering have no known dimensions, mathematical
or financial .... For this reason, the only standard for eva-
luation is such amount as reasonable persons estimate to be
fair compensation.
Neither the plaintiff in the case nor anyone else in the
world has ever established a standard of value for these
ills .... [Jurors] are instructed to allow a reasonable sum as
compensation, and in determining what is" reasonable under
the evidence to be guided by their observation, experience and
sense of fairness and right."
Just because we say jurors can reasonably gauge the monetary
value of pain and suffering by their "observation, experience and
sense of fairness and right" does not mean it is true. It is not.
Even with the benefit of plaintiff's testimony supplemented by
that of experts, the extent of an individual's pain and suffering
remains largely unknowable to jurors. It is doubtful, for example,
that jurors, can understand and appreciate the pain caused by a
crushed vertebra simply by listening to the plaintiff and his ex-
perts tell them about it. Unless one has experienced a similar
injury, he probably has little sense of what it is like to suffer the
injury. Even then, people have different mental fortitudes and
pain thresholds such that probably no two people experience the
same injury in the same way. In this sense,, damages for the value
of lost life are less speculative than damages for other types of
intangible injuries because the full nature of the injury-death-is
always known and certain. Moreover, even if jurors could be
made to understand fully the nature and extent of pain and suf-
fering occasioned by an injury, they are still left with the funda-
mental problem that no common denominator exists allowing the
injury to be translated into dollars and cents. Despite these short-
comings, courts have consistently rejected the argument that dam-
ages for pain and suffering and other intangible injuries are too
45speculative.
4
If certainty were the standard for recovering tort damages,
44 Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ. 82, 95, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958) (citations omitted).
45 See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1974) (loss of
society); D'Ambra v. United States, 518 F.2d 275, 277-78 (1st Cir. 1975) (mental an-
guish); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1214-19 (Utah 1983) (alienation of affections).
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the only damages a plaintiff could collect would be past medical
expenses and lost wages. Not only would damages for intangible,
non-economic injuries be precluded, but also future damages for
tangible, economic injuries, including future pecuniary loss.
Though future pecuniary loss is often viewed as a concrete loss
that can be assessed with some degree of precision, it is subject
to several critical variables which are incapable of being resolved
with any certainty." Even ignoring the virtually insurmountable
difficulties of assessing the pecuniary value of items such as lost
household services and companionship, and focusing upon the
most certain component in the pecuniary loss damage equa-
tion-lost future earnings-jurors are left largely to guesswork.47
How long would the decedent have lived? How long would he
have worked at the same job? In the same occupation? How
much would he have spent on personal consumption? The jury
must speculate as to each of these issues.
Therefore, speculativeness is not an adequate basis for reject-
ing damages for the value of lost life, unless one is prepared to
jettison damages for all types of intangible injuries and for all
future losses. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois agreed in She rrod v. Berry,48 the leading case
recognizing damages for the value of lost life. To the defendants'
argument that hedonic damages are too speculative, the court
responded:
The rule against recovery of 'speculative damages' is generally
directed against uncertainty as to cause rather than uncertainty
as to measure or extent. That is, if it is uncertain whether the
defendant caused the damages, or whether the damages
proved flowed from his act, there may be no recovery of such
46 See Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus On Remedy, 73 CAuF. L. REv.
772, 780 (1985) ("Damages for intangible injuries, although admittedly difficult to quanti-
fy, appear no less justifiable on that basis alone than damages for loss of future wag.
es.").
47 The "too speculative" argument against lost future earnings has been made and
rejected. E.g., Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 601, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("The
law does not require the jury's estimation of damages to be completely free of all ele-
ments of speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975).
48 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Il. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), revd on
other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) (en banc).
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uncertain damages; whereas, 'uncertainty which affects merely
the measure or extent of the injury suffered does not bar a
recovery. 49
To demonstrate that monetary awards for other intangible
injuries are subject to the same objections advanced against dam-
ages for the value of lost life does not, by itself, establish the
propriety of such damages. It does, however, substantially dilute
the arguments against damages for the value of lost life. The two-
pronged argument that hedonic damages are improper because
they fail to compensate and are too speculative commits the logi-
cal fallacy of ignoratio elenchi-that is, it proves a different conclu-
sion than the one sought to be proved.5" Rather than establish
the impropriety of hedonic damages, the arguments support only
the much broader proposition that intangible injuries of any kind
cannot be meaningfully measured in money. This, of course, calls
into question basic assumptions underlying our entire tort
scheme. Consequently, while these arguments may be effective
weapons on a much wider battlefield, they fail to make out a per-
suasive case for discriminating against recovery for the ultimate
injury of deprivation of life.51
C. Damages for the Value of Lost Life and the Deterrent Function of
Tort Law
Though compensation is often thought of as the primary
finction of tort law, deterrence of behavior that causes injuries is
also an important goal.52 Reduced to its starkest form, the deter-
49 629 F. Supp at 164. Sherod is discussed infra at notes 124-34 and accompanying
text.
50 The fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, one of the original thirteen fallades recognized by
Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations, amounts to "missing the point." It occurs when an
argument purporting to establish one conclusion is misdirected, either intentionally or
accidentally, toward proving a different conclusion that is not in, dispute. See I. C6PI,
INTRODUCTION TO LoCiC 85-87 (4th ed. 1972); C.L HAMBLrN, FALLACIES 31-32 (1970).
51 Harper, James and Gray make a similar point in discussing the desirability of
limitations upon damages in death cases generally
Much can be said, for instance, for rules that tend to restrict damages to those
that represent pecuniary loss. Then, too, the times may call for restraint upon
the broad discretion of juries. But these needs, if they exist, warrant a broad
reevaluation of our whole system of damages. Discrimination against death ac-
tions can be justified, if at all, only on the basis that reforms that are equally
needed in the field of personal injury may be more difficult of accomplishment
there.
HARPER, supra note 32, § 25.13 at 597.
52 See generally, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 35, at 4-13 to 4-
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rent concept is very simple: if A knows he will have to compen-
sate B for injuries he inflicts upon B, A will take steps to try to
prevent injury to B to the point where the cost of prevention
exceeds the cost of compensation. Deterrence is an old idea,5"
but has achieved new prominence in the last twenty years under
the stewardship of law and economics scholars.54
The general deterrence model of tort law is grounded on the
notion that tort law should promote the efficient allocation of
resources. Under this view, the policy of tort law is not to elim-
inate accidents, or even to minimize them. It is, rather, to optimize
the number of accidents. To accomplish this, the deterrent model
holds that tort liability rules are (or should be)55 designed to in-
duce actors to expend resources on safer behavior up to the
point where the marginal cost of increased safety exceeds the
marginal reduction in accident costs.56 If liability rules are fash-
ioned in this way, people will invest in safety at the optimal level
because they know it will cost them more if they fail to do so.5
Put more simply, economically efficient tort rules deter risky be-
havior that is not cost-justified.
The extent to which tort liability rules actually operate this
way is hotly debated. Even assuming existing tort liability rules are
53 E.g., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Lansford, 102 F. 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1900) (construing
purpose of Alabama wrongful death statute to be "to prevent homicides").
54 Law and economics has generated a tremendous amount of literature. Major
works with relevance to tort law include: G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); R. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY
(1980); W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 26; Brown, Toward an Economic Theoy of
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis
of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985); Landes & Posner, The Positive Econom-
ic Theoiy of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981) [hereinafter The Positive Econom c Theory
of Tort Law]; Posner, A Theoiy of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Shavell, An
Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463
(1980).
55 Landes and Posner are the primary exponents of the positive economic theory of
tort law, which is that "the common law is best explained as if the judges who created
the law through decisions operating as precedents in subsequent cases were trying to
promote efficient resource allocation." The Positive Economic The oy of Tort Law, supra
note 54, at 851. In other words, Landes and Posner assert that the existing structure of
tort law is built upon rules designed to promote economic efficiency. Other scholars,
such as Calabresi, write about how an ideal economically efficient tort regime should be
structured, declining to accept that the current system operates efficiently. See, e.g.,
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ. 499
(1961).
56 See The Positive Economic Themy of Tort Lath, supra note 54, at 865-72;
57 This is grounded on the basic assumption that people are motivated by a desire
to maximize their wealth. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 26,.at 16-17.
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efficiently designed, critics reject as fanciful the notion that peo-
ple are completely rational beings who alter their behavior in
response to tort liability rules. Professor Stephen Sugarman, in a
thoughtful indictment of the tort system, argues that the general
deterrence approach does not work because: (1) most people lack
adequate information concerning tort liability rules to guide them
in their behavior;5" (2) some people, even if adequately in-
formed, are simply incapable because of incompetence to act safe-
ly;59 (3) people discount the threat of tort liability both economi-
cally, by rationally assuming some victims with bona fide claims
will not sue, and psychologically, by simply disregarding the risk
of harm their conduct presents; 0 (4) some people act dangerous-
ly because there are high stakes involved for them in doing so;1
and (5) few tortfeasors are required to absorb a substantial penal-
ty for their behavior.6 2
Although these criticisms of the behavioral assumptions upon
which the deterrent approach depends are sound,68 they show
only that the economic model is imperfect. As Professor Howard
Latin wrote in response to Sugarman's article: "A balanced analy-
sis must ask, 'Imperfect compared to what?' "64 Since no system
can achieve perfect deterrence, the real issue is whether tort lia-
bility creates more effective deterrence than would exist in the
absence of tort liability.6
5
The answer is that it probably does. While most individuals
probably do not make decisions based upon anticipated tort liabil-
ity, many professionals and businesses undoubtedly do. Thus, an
automobile driver's decision to pass a car in front of him is prob-
ably tempered more by an instinct for self-preservation than a
concern about being sued, but. a doctor is very likely to be influ-
enced by the threat of tort liability in deciding whether to per-
58 "The model of general deterrence requires knowledge. Yet many people seem to
be ignorant of the threat of tort liability before the first sting." Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L REv. 555, 565 (1985).
59 Id. at 568-69.
60 I at 569.
61 Id. at 570.
62 Id. at 570-73.
63 For further critique of the behavioral assumptions involved in the general deter-
rence analysis, see G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTuAL HISTORY 220-
23 (1980); Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis" A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort
Law, 72 CORNELL L REV. 765, 772-75 (1987).
64 Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677,
739 (1985).
65 Id. at 740.
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form a particular diagnostic test.66 This is amply supported by
surveys of physicians in which overwhelming majorities reported
that they have increased diagnostic procedures, monitoring and
documentation of their activities because of the rise in malprac-
tice suits.Y7 Manufacturers are another prominent group of po-
tential injurers likely to consider tort liability in making safety
decisions. While empirical evidence concerning the deterrent im-
pact of products liability rules is conflicting,68 one can intuit that
if a manufacturer gets hit over the head with a million dollar
judgment hammer several times for failing to take a cost-efficient
safety measure, the manufacturer will take steps to correct the
defect or go out of business.69
Assuming that tort law does have a deterrent effect, everyone
agrees that the general deterrence approach works only if the ac-
tors are required to bear the full cost of their injury-causing activities.0
66 See Fujii, On the Compensation of Victims of Torts, 5 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL JOURNAL 42 (1980) ("[S]afety steps such as sponge counts, instrument counts,
electrical grounding of anesthesia machines, and the avoidance of colorless sterilizing
solutions in spinal anesthesia became widely used only after the successful prosecution of
medical negligence cases.")..
67 See Bell, Legislative Intrusions Into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts
About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 966-69 (1984) (dis-
cussing these surveys).
68 George L Priest, of the Brookings Institution, evaluating product-oriented death
and injury statistics, found "no evidence that the expansion of [products liability] litiga-
tion has affected the injury or death rate." Priest, Product Liability Law and the Accident
Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 185, 194 (1988). The injury and death rates
are probably not reliable indicators of the deterrent effect of law, since other factors,
such as increased product use, could offset the impact of safer products. For purposes
of the general deterrence model, it is more meaningful to look at how the law has
made businesses change their behavior. A study of 232 major U.S. corporations revealed
that 35% improved the labeling of their products and 30% improved the safety design
of products in response to products liability law. N. WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE
CORPORATE RESPONSE 4-7 (1987).
69 Most courts now apply some form of risk-utility balancing in defective design
cases for determining whether a product was in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous. Priest, supra note 68, at 212. Under this test, a product is defective only if
the risk of the product as designed outweighs the utility of the product as designed.
Utility is often analyzed in terms of feasible alternative designs. Feasibility focuses upon
whether other designs would impair either the cost-utility or the use-utility of the prod-
uct. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 65-69, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326-28
(1978). See generally KEETON, supra note 22, at 699-700. Risk-utility balancing in products
cases promotes efficient accident reduction by holding manufacturers responsible only for
failing to take feasible, cost-efficient safety measures. See Priest, supra note 68, at 212.
70 See, e.g., Litan, Swire & Winston, The U.S. Liability System: Background and Trends,
in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 1, 3 (1988) ("[if producers and other partici-
pants in the economy are not charged for the costs they impose on others through
accidents and injuries, resources will be mis-allocated toward activities that create or
perpetuate risks."); Ingber, supra note 46, at 799 ("Unless the full costs of physical and
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Unless this occurs, actors have insufficient incentive to invest in
safer behavior. As a result, there will be too many accidents be-
cause actors will not be required to pay as much for exposing
people to risks as they would have to pay to avoid those risks.
This furnishes courts with a basis upon which to recognize
damages for the value of lost life. By focusing upon pecuniary
loss to the survivors and ignoring the value of life itself, existing
law systematically undervalues the harm caused by wrongful death.
Because they are not required to internalize the value of life as a
cost of their activity, would-be tortfeasors are not adequately de-
terred from engaging in behavior which presents a risk of
death."1 Professor Sugarman targeted this deficiency in the dam-
age rules for wrongful death in his critique of the economic mod-
el:
The "law and economics" model requires the correct threat in
order to produce the appropriate safety-minded response. Or-
dinary tort damages are an inaccurate and confused measure
of our desire to deter, however. For example, torts-sends out
the economic message that one may take less precaution to
avoid killing someone than to avoid permanently injuring them
emotional distress are properly internalized through tort law, the price of the activities
that generated such injuries will insufficiently reflect their actual costs."); Smith, supra
note 63, at 773 ("Optimal levels would be achieved only if all actual injury costs-and
no more than actual costs-were allocated to the injury-causing activities.").
71 Other factors also work against optimal efficiency by insulating the tortfeasor
from the costs of injuries he inflicts. Many claims for injury are never brought. Pierce,
Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV.
1281, 1296 (1980) ("Only a small fraction of personal injuries . . . actually yield a claim
for compensation."). Where claims are pursued, liability insurance often serves to exter-
nalize at least part of the cost. See Bell, supra note 67, at 954-65 (discussing the immu-
nizing effect of malpractice insurance upon physicians). Landes and Posner dispute the
argument that liability insurance externalizes the costs of accidents:
A persistent fallacy is that liability insurance externalizes the costs of acci-
dents and hence' reduces the deterrent effect of tort law. It does reduce deter-
rence, but it does not necessarily create an externality and thus need not re-
duce the efficiency of the tort law as a method of social control-always bearing
in mind that the economic function of tort law is to optimize rather than mini-
mize the number of accidents. If injurers are fully liable for accidents owing to
their negligence and if they persuade others (liability insurers) to bear a part of
the burden of this tort liability, there is no externality. Victims are by definition
fully compensated for any extra accidents that occur, and liability insurers are
fully compensated ex ante for the payments they make to the injurers whom
they insure.
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 13. See also James, Accident Liability Reconsid-
ere& The Impact of Liability Itsurance, 57 YALE LJ. 549, 559-63 (1948) (asserting that
liability insurance has had a positive effect on safety).
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since, by the way damages are measured, it is cheaper to kill
than to disable. Similarly, torts tells the rational would-be injur-
er that he may take less precaution to avoid killing a child
than a working adult. Tort law creates these implicit priorities
because it awards damages to compensate rather than to deter.
But from the perspective of accident avoidance, these priorities
do not reflect our social values.7
The general deterrence model concentrates largely on the
efficiency of liability rules, but its validity depends as well upon
efficient damage rules that account for the full cost of injury. In
cases involving death, this requires that the tortfeasor be responsi-
ble for the value of the life lost.7 The pecuniary loss rule fails
to impose this cost and, therefore, results in under-deterrence.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico recognized this in a wrongful
death case involving a nun who was killed when a tire blew out
on her rental car. 4 Catherine Lavan had taken a vow of poverty
when she became a nun. This fact arguably barred any recovery
since the New Mexico wrongful death statute seemed to limit
damages to the pecuniary loss suffered by the decedent's benefi-
ciaries.' The Supreme Court of New Mexico, however, recog-
nized a right to recovery on a deterrence basis:
The statutes allowing damages for wrongful act or neglect
causing death have for their purpose more than compensation.
It is intended by them, also, to promote safety of life and limb
by making negligence that causes death costly to the wrongdo-
er ....
... [S]ubstantial damages are recoverable without proof
72 Sugarman, supra note 58, at 572-73.
73 See Cohen., Toward an Economic Theoy of the Measurement of Damages in a Wrong-
ful Death Action, 34 EMoRY L.J. 295, 295-96 (1985); Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort
Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1113-14 (1985).
74 Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970), ajfg 81 N.M. 69, 463
P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1969).
75 When Stang was decided, the New Mexico wrongful death statute provided as
follows:
Every such action as mentioned in section 1821 [22-20-1] shall be brought in
the name of the personal representative or representatives of such deceased
person, and the jury in every such action may give such damages, compensatory
and exemplary, as they shall deem fair and just, taking into consideration the pecu-
niary injuty or injuries resulting from such death to the surviving party or parties
entitled to the judgment; or any interest therein, recovered in such action, and also
having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such
wrongful act, neglect or default.




Of course, the problem with awarding damages for the value
of lost life for the purpose of deterrence is computing an eco-
nomically efficient amount. In any mathematical sense, this prob-
lem is insoluble, and no doubt there are those with a longing for
precision who would reject lost life damages for this reason.
However, the argument that lost life damages should be de-
nied because they cannot be formulaically inserted into the deter-
rence equation again proves too much, for the argument would
apply with equal force to all kinds of intangible damages. If we
accept that the deterrence model has any validity, we must also
accept, as even opponents of the theory assert, that the defendant
should be forced to internalize the cost of all injuries. This re-
quires that some value, however imperfect, be attached to human
life. What that value should be is discussed in Part IlI of this
Article.
D. Damages for the Value of Lost Life and Symbolic Justice
Perhaps the justification for lost life damages ultimately tran-
scends economic analysis and finds root in the more fundamental
principle of symbolic justice. Life, which Blackstone called "the
immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every indi-
vidual,""' is valuable. But existing wrongful death schemes treat
only some lives as valuable. If a statistical study were performed,
it would no doubt show that the most valuable lives in America
for purposes of tort law are, as a class, white businessmen. To the
extent life is recognized as valuable only as to those already sus-
pected of loading the fortune wheels of justice, an appearance of
indifference and injustice to less-favored victims is fostered.'
The right to life is the preeminent entitlement in a system of
rights premised upon personal security and autonomy. Without it;
all other entitlements become meaningless. The tort system serves
to protect entitlements by performing "corrective justice" when
entitlements are wrongfully infringed.7" However, a refusal to
grant damages for loss of life not only fails to protect our entitle-
ment to life. In effect, it bestows a kind of entitlement upon the
76 Stang, 81 N.M. at 350, 351, 467 P.2d at 16-17 (citations omitted).
77 W. BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (Cooley, 3d ed.
1884).
78 Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARv. L REV. 851, 877 (1984).
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tortfeasor to take the life.79 When society allows tortious losses
to rest where they fall, it makes an implicit determination that the
injurer was entitled to impose those losses.80 With respect to
damages for wrongful death, the entitlement is by no means com-
plete .because some recovery usually is available. Nevertheless, by
not recognizing any recovery for the loss of life itself, the right to
life-the most precious of all entitlements in a rights-oriented sys-
tem-is depreciated.
We can test current wrongful death damage rules by consid-
ering them in the context of Professor John Rawls' model for
assessing principles of justice. Rawls suggests that we imagine a
group of persons who meet for the purpose of forming a new
society. Their initial goals are to select the basic principles for
assigning rights and obligations among members of the society
and to determine how social benefits are to be divided."' They
are, in other words, to agree in advance upon a just social con-
tract.
Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their
claims against one another and what is to be the foundation
charter of their society. Just as each person must decide by
rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is the system
of ends which it is rational for him to pursue, so a group of
persons must decide once and for all what is to count among
them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would
make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming
for the present that this choice problem has a solution, deter-
mines the principles of justice.'
One of the essential requirements of this hypothetical is that the
79 See "Ingber, supra note 46, at 781-82 (making this argument as to intangible
losses, generally).
80 Id. at 781. Professor Ingber found support for his position in the following de-
scription of entitlement:
When a loss is left where it falls . . . it is not because God so ordained it.
Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free
of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim's friends, if they are stron-
ger, from taking compensation from the injurer. The loss is shifted in other
cases because the state has granted an entitlement to compensation and will
intervene to prevent the stronger injurer from rebuffing the victim's requests for
compensation.
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1972), quoted in Ingber, supra note 46, at 781
n.45.
81 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTiCE 11 (1971).
82 Id. at 11-12.
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society-formers have no knowledge of their own station or situa-
tion in life."3 This is Rawls' "veil of ignorance," 4 which ensures
that principles of justice are chosen neutrally, with no one having
an opportunity to act in their own interest.
Picture our imaginary founding fathers and mothers as they
are nearing completion of their list of principles for a just society:
Founding Father: I note that the first principle on our list is
that all persons have a right to life. As I
recall, we put that first because we felt it
was the most important. But suppose some-
one interferes with that right. It seems like
there should be some principle about what
the consequences of that will be.
Founding Mother: We have already covered that. Look at
principle No. 124. That's where we im-
posed severe criminal penalties for wrong-
fully taking another's life. And if you turn
over to principle No. 239, you see there
that we have provided for a system of tort
law that allows for the recovery of money
damages when someone wrongfully takes
the life of another.
Founding Father: Yes, I see those. But we haven't specified
any principles of justice to govern the
amount of those damages. I have an idea
about that. *
Founding Mother: Great. Let's hear it.
Founding Father: I propose that we create a principle of
justice that treats all lives differently for
purposes of awarding damages. If you take
the life of a wealthy person, you have to
-pay a whole lot of money. But if you take
the life of a poor person, you don't have to
pay very much.
[silence]
Also, it seems just to me that we should
treat the lives of elderly people as not be-
ing worth very much.
[more silence]
83 I& at 12.
84 Id.
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And finally-this is perfect-we should treat
the lives of children as having no worth at
all.
[oppressive silence]
The proposals are greeted with shock and disbelief. The other
founders cannot comprehend how what are supposed to be neu-
tral principles of justice; relating to the foremost entitlement in
the new society, could be so blatantly unfair and discriminatory.
Yet, in our own society, we have accepted almost without
question a system that essentially incorporates these proposals
insofar as it effectively values life almost exclusively in terms of
the decedent's economic station. By providing no recovery for the
loss of life itself, we operate under a system that is contrary to
fundamental justice. Therefore, as a matter of symbolic justice
and apart from the traditional purposes underlying the tort sys-
tem, damages for lost life should be recognized.
III. DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF LOST LIFE UNDER CURRENT
LAW
Damages for the value of lost life face an uphill battle to
achieve widespread recognition. While several federal courts have
discovered a basis for awarding them in civil rights death ac-
tions,8 5 only one state has applied its death remedies to autho-
rize such damages.8 6 The following Section discusses the federal
civil rights cases and the opportunities for and obstacles to recov-
ering damages for lost life under existing state survival and
wrongful death statutes.
A. Federal Civil Rights Actions
By far, the warmest reception for lost life damages has been
in federal courts entertaining actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
The availability of damages for the value of lost life in section
85 See infra note 113.
86 See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
87 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person with-
in the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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1983 cases alleging unconstitutional deprivation of life turns upon
the interplay between federal law and state death remedies called
for by 42 U.S.C. § 1988."8 Section 1988 directs courts to apply
state law where the federal civil rights statutes are "deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies," 9 unless
state law is "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."9" The Seventh Circuit, in upholding a $100,000
damage award for the value of lost life, described three steps
involved in the process of selecting the appropriate rule of sub-
stantive law:
First, the court must decide whether the civil rights acts are
"deficient" in furnishing a particular rule. If this inquiry is
answered affirmatively, state law is examined to fill the inter-
stices in. the federal provisions .... [F]inally, the state law
must be disregarded in favor of the federal law if the state law
is inconsistent with the meaning and purpose of federal statu-
tory and constitutional law.91
Section 1983, consisting of only a single operative sentence, is
"deficient" as to many issues of substantive law, including damage
issues. Consequently, selection of the correct rule of law usually
depends upon an examination of state law and a determination of
whether state law is inconsistent with federal law.
The threshold challenge in section 1983 death cases is to
discover a substantive basis for maintaining the action after death.
This issue is inextricably intertwined with ascertaining the relief to
be afforded. Because section 1983 is silent as to any death reme-
88 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by ... [section 1983] for the protection of all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and en-
forced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapt-
ed to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be ex-




91 Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1234 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Robertson
v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 587 (1978) and Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840,
841 (S.D. Fla. 1983). The Bel court synthesized this tripartite test from the Supreme
Court's decision in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 587-90 (1978).
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dy, courts must first look to state law to determine whether the
decedent's claim survives and/or whether the decedent's survivors
are able to recover their own losses through a wrongful death
claim. 9
2
Where the action is cast as one on behalf of the estate in the
nature, of a survival action, courts will borrow and apply the state
survival statute. Difficulties arise only where state law would pre-
clude survival of the federal claim. In that situation, most federal
courts have relied upon a pair of inapposite Supreme Court cases
and allowed the claim to survive on an independent federal ba-
SS93sis.9
In Robertson v. Wegmann,94 the Supreme Court held that a
Louisiana statute could abate a section 1983 claim upon the
plaintiff's death where the death was unconnected to the alleged
constitutional deprivation. Clay Shaw died from an unrelated
cause while his section 1983 action based upon malicious prosecu-
tion was pending. Under Louisiana law, Shaw's claim would sur-
vive only in favor of a spouse, children or siblings, of which Shaw
had none. The lower courts found the Louisiana law to be incon-
sistent with federal law, and avoided it by creating a federal com-
mon law right of survival in civil rights actions.9 5
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court recognized that in
evaluating asserted inconsistencies between state and federal law-
courts must look not only at positive federal law but also at the
policies underlying it.96 Nevertheless, the Court found no incon-
sistency between the policies behind section 1983-compensation
and deterrence-and the Louisiana statute precluding survival of
Shaw's claim. The interest in compensating those injured by a
92 S. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 21 (1989). The law
regarding section 1983 death cases is in disarray-in part because plaintiffs fail to specify
the theory upon which they are proceeding. For example, in Bass v. Wallenstein, 769
F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit reversed a $250,000 award to the estate
of a prisoner who died because of improper medical treatment on the basis that the
district court had improperly instructed the jury that it could measure damages in
accordance with Illinois wrongful death law. The amended complaint showed that the
plaintiff was asserting the decedent's claim and was not suing on behalf of the
decedent's survivors. Id- at 1188. Therefore, since the action was more in the nature of
a survival action, wrongful death damages were improper.
93 See, e.g., Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[C]laims
arising under §1983 survive as a principle of federal common law without regard to
state law.").
94 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
95 Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1368 (E.D. La. 1975), af'd, 545 F.2d 980,
987 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub noma. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
96 Robema, 436 U.S. at 590.
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deprivation of constitutional rights, the Court said, is not served
by compensating the executor of a deceased's estate.97 With re-
gard to deterrence, the Court observed:
[T]o find even a marginal influence on behavior as a result of
Louisiana's survivorship provisions, one would have to make
the rather farfetched assumptions that a state official had both
the desire and the ability deliberately to select as victims only
those persons who would die before conclusion of the § 1983
suit (for reasons entirely unconnected with the official illegali-
ty) and who would not be survived by any dose relatives."
The Court then implied that the deterrence consideration would
weigh differently where death results from the alleged constitu-
tional violation.9
The Court's decision a year later in Carlson v. Green ° ° sub-
stantially bolstered this inference. In Carlson, the Court held that
Indiana survival and wrongful death l5w should not be applied to
bar a Bivens action' against federal officials arising from the
death of a federal prisoner. Robertson was not seen as posing an
obstacle because "the plaintiffs death [in Robertson] was not
caused by the acts of the defendant upon which the suit was.
based.""0 2 Part of the Court's reasoning in support of a uniform
rule of survivorship for Bivens actions was that Bivens actions are
completely federal in nature. 10 3 Nevertheless, the Court also em-
phasized that such a rule is necessary to deter federal officials
from infringing constitutional rights. 04 Most courts which have
subsequently addressed the issue in section 1983 cases have con-
strued Carlson as mandating the survival of section 1983 claims as
a means of deterring unconstitutional deprivations of life. 05
97 Id. at 592.
98 Id. at 592, 593 n.10.
99 The Court emphasized that its holding was "a narrow one," stating it was ex-
pressing no opinion "about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in a
situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death." Id. at 594.
100 446 U.S. 14 (1979).
101 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of. Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), the Court created a right of action for money damages against federal
officials for unconstitutional conduct that is analogous to the right of action created by
§ 1983 against state and local officials.
102 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24.
103 Id- at 23-24, 24 n.11.
104 Id- at 23.
105 See, e.g., Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1308-09 (S.D. Ala. 1986); Guyton
v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981); O'Connor v. Several Unknown
Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981). Justices Powell and
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Related to the survival issue is whether section 1983 allows
the decedent's survivors to sue for damages in their own right in
the nature of a wrongful death action. The Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue, although Justice Marshall noted in Robert-
son that the Court's holding did not "preclude recovery by survi-
vors who are suing under § 1983 for injury to their own inter-
ests."10 6 Justice Marshall also cited with apparent approval the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Brazier v. Cherry, °7 the seminal deci-
sion recognizing the borrowing of state wrongful death remedies
in section 1983 actions."' 8 Despite the absence of clear Supreme
Court direction on the issue, a number of lower federal courts
have borrowed state wrongful death remedies in section 1983
cases to allow survivors to recover damages for harm caused to
them on account of the death of a loved one.'09
In Robertson and Carlson, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the survival of civil rights claims would help deter unconstitutional
deprivations of life. But borrowing state survival or wrongful
death statutes alone does not promote deterrence. If the damages
available under those remedial schemes are insubstantial, which is
often the case, simply recognizing the cause of action will have
little deterrent effect. Under survival statutes, damages generally
are limited to the decedent's lost wages, medical expenses, and
pain and suffering occurring from the date of injury until
death.110 Where death is the near instantaneous result of a po-
lice officer's bullet (a common fact pattern in section 1983 death
actions),"' there may be no cognizable damages under state sur-
Stewart stated in their concurring opinions in Carlson that they would reach the same
result in § 1983 cases. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 29.
106 Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.9.
107 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961), cited with approval
in Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594.
108 The Supreme Court also favorably cited Brazier in Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 703 n.14 (1973), and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
240 (1969).
109 See, e.g., Smith v. Wickline, 396 F. Supp. 555, 560 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (applying
Oklahoma wrongful death statute); Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304, 306 (M.D.
Ala. 1974) (applying Alabama wrongful death statute); Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp.
930, 931 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (applying California wrongful death statute).
110 KEE ON, supra note 22, § 126, at 943.
111 The Supreme Court revamped the standards governing excessive force claims in
1989, rejecting the widely adopted substantive due process analysis, and holding that
analysis must proceed under some specific constitutional provision. Graham v. Connor,
109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989). In most instances, that will be either the fourth
amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures or the eighth amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
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vival law. Wrongful death damages" often are inadequate as well.
The victims in wrongful killing cases are often minors and/or
minority members, both of whom are discriminated against by the
traditional pecuniary loss rule for wrongful death damages.
11 2
In recognition of this, a handful of federal courts have relied
upon the deterrence rationale not only as a justification for fash-
ioning a substantive death remedy in 1983 actions, but also as a
basis for allowing damages for the value of lost life.1 3 These
federal courts have ruled that state law precluding compensation
for lost life is inconsistent with federal law. The courts reasoned
that, absent recognition of damages for the value of lost life, pub-
lic officers will not be sufficiently deterred from engaging in un-
constitutional conduct causing death. The most straightforward
statement of this reasoning is found in Roman v. City of Rich-
mond,"' where the federal district court stated:
[W]here damages permitted by state law do not sufficiently
fulfill the purposes of section 1983, the state law is inconsis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
state remedies are not exclusive. In such a case the court may
fashion an appropriate remedy that will fulfill the purposes of
section 1983 ....
... Actual damages where a death has resulted from the
use of excessive force is generally quite limited. However,
112 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
113 Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Linzie v. City of Columbia, Mo., 651 F. Supp. 740 (W.D.
Mont. 1986); Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), afl'd 827 F.2d 195 (7th
Cir. 1987), av'd on other grounds 856 F.2d 802 (1988) (en banc); Ronian v. City of
Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154
(N.D. Cal. 1981). See also O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F.
Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1981) (although not specifically mentioning damages for loss of
life, the court rejected damage limitations of Virginia's wrongful death statute and said
recovery could be obtained for the deprivation of the decedent's civil rights).
114 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Roman was a police shooting case in which
the jury awarded the plaintiffs $1.5 million in damages. Defendants filed motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that plaintiffs' recoveries were barred by
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Parmtt, a Nebraska prisoner filed a § 1983
action alleging he was deprived of property without due process when jail officials
negligently lost his hobby kit valued at $23.50. The Supreme Court rejected the claim,
holding that procedural due process is satisfied where state law furnishes an adequate
poit-deprivation remedy. Id. at 543-44. The defendants in Roman argued that California's
wrongful death statute constituted an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 570 F. Supp. at
1555. The court initially expressed doubt whether Parratt applies to excessive force cases.
Then, assuming it did, the court held that the California wrongful death remedy was
inadequate because it failed to provide for injunctive relief and did not fulfill the deter-
rent purposes of § 1983. Id. at 1556.
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where the use of excessive force results only in injury, actual
damages can be great because of the need for medical treat-
ment and rehabilitation. Where a defendant is required to
bear a greater economic loss where he injures a person by the
use of excessive force than when he kills the person, the result
is a tacit authorization that the actor should inflict excessive
force to the point of death. Life is the greatest and most cher-
ished of all rights, and therefore such a result cannot be coun-
tenanced. Thus, courts must fashion a remedy to prevent this
result; an award of damages to deter such an unconstitutional
use of force is appropriate."
This pure deterrence rationale is difficult to reconcile with
the Supreme Court's increasingly clear pronouncements that only
damages intended to compensate for actual harm are proper un-
der section 1983. While the Court has recognized the deterrent
function of remedies under section 1983, it said in Carey v.
Piphusx.6 that "[t]o the extent that Congress intended that
awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitution-
al rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deter-
rent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compen-
satory damages." n7
More recently, in Memphis Community School District v.
Stachura, s the Court again emphasized that "[s]ection 1983 pre-
supposes that damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily
suffice to deter constitutional violations."" 9 Stachura was a sec-
tion 1983 suit brought by a school teacher suspended for teaching
reproductive science to his seventh grade students. The district
court instructed the jury that it could award the plaintiff damages
based upon the value or importance of the constitutional rights
that the defendant violated."' The Supreme Court found error
in this, holding that compensatory damages cannot be awarded in
115 Roman, 570 F. Supp. at 1557 (citation omitted).
116 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In Carey, the Court rejected the argument that elementary
and secondary school students, suspended without procedural 'due process, were entitled
to recover substantial damages without proof of actual injury. The students had argued
that substantial damages were appropriate both because constitutional rights are valuable
in themselves, and because of the need to deter constitutional violations. Id. at 254.
117 Id. at 256. The Court recognized that punitive or exemplary damages might be
justified in particular cases. Id. at 257 n.11. But this is not the issue in cases involving
damages for lost life. Though they are rooted in the policy of deterrence, no court has
treated them as punitive damages.
118 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
119 Id. at 310 (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 256-57).
120 Id. at 302-03.
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section 1983 cases based upon the abstract value of constitutional
rights.12 1
As a result of Carey and Stachura, damages for lost life in
section 1983 cases probably need to, undergo a judicial facelift to
survive. Although some courts have emphasized the compensatory
function of lost life damages,' 2 2 others have focused exclusively
upon the deterrence rationale.123 With Carey and Stachurii sug-
gesting that pure deterrent damages are improper, courts need to
redefine the rationale for lost life damages in terms of their com-
pensatory purpose.
That should not be difficult to do. On appeal of the verdict
for hedonic damages in Sherrod v. Berry,124 the Seventh Circuit
panel rejected the argument that Stachura required reversal of the
award. 25 Sherrod was an excessive force case in which a nine-
teen-year-old black man was shot in the head at point-blank range
by a police officer who believed the victim was reaching in his
jacket for a weapon. 1 6 Apparently, he was reaching only for his
driver's license.'27 Unlike Stachura, the court reasoned, Sherrod
did not require the jury to award damages based upon its subjec-
tive evaluation of the importance of particular constitutional
rights.1 8 Rather, damages were awarded to compensate the
decedent's father both in his capacity as administrator of his son's
estate and in his individual capacity. 129 No explanation was of-
fered as to how damages for lost life actually serve a compensa-
tory purpose.
Once it is understood that damages for lost life are to be
121 Id. at 310.
122 F&g., Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("The
decedent's loss of life, which is the deprivation here, is a compensable injury that sur-
vives and is recoverable by his estate.").
123 E.g., Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983). In
Roman, which was decided after Carey but before Stachura," the court instructed the jury
that "it could consider the need to deter and prevent abuses by municipal officers that
cause deprivations of constitutional rights in awarding damages." Id. at 1556. Unless the
court also made it clear that damages could be awarded only to compensate for loss of
the decedent's life, the instructions would appear to be defective under Carey and
Stachura.
124 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Iil. 1985), af'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
other ground; 856 F.2d 802 (1988) (en banc).
125 Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1987), reu'd on other grounds, 856
F.2d 802 (1988) (en banc).
126 Id. at 199.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 208-09.
129 Id. at 209.
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treated as compensatory damages in section 1983 actions, the
value of a human life becomes the obvious bench-mark for mea-
suring such damages. This was the approach adopted in Sherro-
d."' The trial court allowed the plaintiff to call an economist as
an expert witness to testify as to the "hedonic" value of human
life. The expert defined this term as follows:
It derives from the word pleasing or pleasure. I believe it
is a Greek word. It is distinct from the word economic. So it
refers to the larger value of life, the life at the pleasure of
society, if you will, the life-the value including economic, in-
cluding moral, including philosophical, including all the value
with which you might hold life, is the meaning of the expres-
sion "hedonic value." 31
The jury returned a verdict awarding $850,000 for the value
the decedent's life." 2 The Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the
admissibility of the expert's testimony, holding that "[i]t is there-
fore axiomatic that plaintiffs seeking to recover the value of a
decedent's life must be entitled to submit expert testimony to
help guide the jury in reaching an appropriate damages
award."' On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit ultimately
reversed on other grounds.'34
130 Sherwd has generated considerable attention to the issue of damages for the
value of lost life. See Marcotte, Hedonic Update: Case Revesed on Other Grounds, 75 A.B.A.
J. 29 (1989), Blodgett, Hedonic Damages OK Court Upholds New Award, 73 A.B.A. J. 21
(1987); Blodgett, Hedonic Damages: A Price on the Pleasure of Life, 71 A.B.A. J. 25 (1985);
Blum, supra note 42; Barrett, supra note 36; Tapp, supra note 36; Angel, supra note 1, at
1, col. 2; Centerpiece: Expert Testimony is Admissible to Enable the Juty to Consider the "He-
donic" Value of Life in a Wrongful Death Case, 30 A.T.L.A. L. Rptr. 408 (1987); Staller,
Hedonic Damages: How to Assess 'Life's Pleasures', Penn. L. J.-Rptr., Jan. 7, 1985, at 1, col.
1; Tarr, Illinois Juiy Awards 'Hedonic' Damages, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 24, 1984, at 3, col. 1;
Kaberon, $1.6 Million Award has 'Hedonic' Value, Chi. Daily L Bull., Nov. 5, 1984, at 1,
col. 7.
131 629 F. Supp. at 163. Prior to Sherrod, courts considering lost-life damages in
section 1983 actions usually ignored the method by which they should be computed.
The only effort at analysis was a feeble one. In Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154
(N.D. Cal. 1981), the court, after rejecting the argument that fixing damages for lost life
is too speculative, concluded that "it is appropriate to look at damages in other depriva-
tion cases and arrive at an amount that fairly represents the loss of human life." Id. at
1168. Surveying cases in which damage awards for liberty deprivations ranged from $750
to $10,000, the court determined that $100,000 was a reasonable amount. Id.
132 Sherrod, 629 F. Supp at 160.
133 Sherrod, 827 F.2d at 205.
134 Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The court held that
the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the plaintiff's decedent, Ronald Sherrod,
was unarmed. Defendant Berry, who shot Sherrod, was unaware of this fact, and the
court noted: "The reception of evidence . .. beyond that which Officer Berry had ...
is improper, irrelevant, and prejudicial . . . ." Id. at 805. The court specifically relied on
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The Supreme Court has not addressed the propriety of
awarding damages for the value of lost life. While the Court indi-
cated in Carey v. Piphus35 that common law tort rules may not
always provide a complete solution to damage issues in section
1983 cases,"3 6 it has never expressly approved bypassing damage
limitations in state death remedies to effectuate policies underly-
ing the civil rights statutes. It passed up the opportunity to do so
in Jones v. Hildebrant.'37 In Jones, a mother brought a section
1983 action in her own name arising from the fatal shooting of
her fifteen-year-old son by a Denver police officer. A trial court
ruling, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado,
effectively limited any possible recovery to the $45,000 maximum
authorized by the Colorado wrongful death statute.3 '
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "whether a
state's limitation on damages in a wrongful death statute would
control in an action brought pursuant to section 1983.""'x How-
ever, the Court subsequently dismissed the certiorari petition after
counsel for the mother redefined her claim at oral argument to
be a personal constitutional liberty claim, rather than a property-
based, wrongful-death-type claim arising from the harm inflicted
upon her son. 140 Because this newly delineated claim was not
set forth in her complaint or mentioned in her briefs, 14 ' the
Court declined to rule upon the issue of whether state wrongful
death damage limitations are binding in section 1983 wrongful
death cases. 42
a "Sioux Indian[] . .. prayer that asks for this wisdom: 'Grant that I may not judge
another until I have walked a mile in his moccasins.'" Id. at 807.
135 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
136 Id. at 258.
137 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1061, cert. dismissed, 432
U.S. 183 (1977) (overruled by Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo.), celt. granted, 454
U.S. 1122 (1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 430 (1982)).
138 Id. at 7-8, 550 P.2d at 341. The mother asserted three claims: battery, negligence
and deprivation of federal constitutional rights. She conceded that her first two claims,
grounded in state law, were controlled by the Colorado wrongfil death statute. The trial
court, however, ruled that the mother's § 1983 claim merged with her first claim and
dismissed -it, the effect of which was to limit her to a maximum possible recovery of
$45,000. Id.
139 432 U.S. at 185.
140 Id. The mother's counsel described her claim at oral argument "as a constitution-
al right to raise her child without interference from the State." Id.
141 Id. at 186.
142 Id. at 187-88. Without addressing the merits of the mother's personal liberty
interest claim, the Court did observe that "it would not seem logically to be subject to a
damages limitation contained in the statute permitting survivors to recover for wrongs
19961
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Accordingly, the ultimate fate of damages for the value of
lost life in section 1983 cases remains uncertain. Section 1983
actions currently offer the best opportunity for recovering these
damages. This may not remain true for long, however, given the
current Court's bent toward limiting civil rights remedies. 14
B. Damages for the Value of Lost Life Under State Law
Damages for the value of lost life are the missing link in
death remedies afforded under state law. Survival statutes allow
recovery for injuries incurred by the decedent, but only up to the
point of death. At that time, wrongful death statutes kick in to
furnish the decedent's survivors a remedy for their losses arising
from the death. The decedent's loss of life, which goes uncom-
pensated, is lost in a kind of legal limbo. Absent legislative action,
advocates of lost-life damages will be required to use existing state
survival statutes or wrongful death statutes as their vehicles for
recovery. Both are leaky vessels for this journey. However, while
true survival statutes 44 are unsuited for recovery of lost-life
damages, the wrongful death statutes of a substantial minority of
done to a property interest of theirs." Id. at 188.
143 This change dramatically appeared during the 1988 term, when the Court decid-
ed a number of cases restricting or refusing to expand civil rights remedies: Indepen-
dent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989) (no attorney's fees to
prevailing civil rights plaintiff against intervenor who delayed plaintiff's settlement agree-
ment for three years and cost plaintiff an additional $200,000 in litigation expenses);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 .(1989) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides
no remedy for private racial harassment on the job); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacity
are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261
(1989) (female employees time-barred from challenging seniority system even though the
system did not operate to penalize them until three years after it took effect); Martin v.
Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (white firefighters who failed to intervene in Title VII suit
by black firefighters that was settled by consent decree permitted to later challenge
actions taken pursuant to the decree as reverse discrimination); Wards Cove Packing Co.,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate that employment practices
resulting in racial imbalance are not justified by business necessity); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (alleviating employer's burden of proof in discrimination
cases).
For an explanation of the argument that hedonic damages should not be treated
separately, see Murray, Hedonic Damages: Properly a Factor Within Pain and Suffering Under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 10 N. ILL. U.L REV. 37 (1989) (concluding that "[h]edonic
damages are best left as factors to be considered in the jury's pain and suffering award.
To remove hedonic damages and set them up as a separate element in the damage
calculus violates the compensatory purpose of Section 1983." Id. at 67).
144 Some states have hybrid statutes that provide for survival of the decedent's
claims, but enlarge the survival action to include damages for wrongful death. See infra
note 156 and accompanying text.
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states are subject to a construction allowing such recovery.
1. Recovery Under Survival Statutes.
At common law, personal tort actions did not survive the
death of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Today, virtually all
states have enacted survival statutes which have modified this
rule. 4 5 These statutes provide for the continuation of the
decedent's claims after death, and hence, superficially appear to
provide a basis for recovering damages for loss of life on the
decedent's behalf. Survival actions, however, are not based upon
the decedent's death, and survival statutes do not create any new
claim arising from the event of death.1 46 They merely keep the
preexisting injury claim alive after death as an asset of the
decedent's estate, and limit damages to those that occurred from
the time of injury until death.1 47
Hedonic damage claims do not fit within this statutory
scheme because they are predicated upon the death itself: the
decendent's estate seeks damages for the harm inflicted by
death-the loss of life. Survival statutes merely authorize the dam-
ages to which the decedent would have been entitled had he
lived.1 4' Had he lived, however, the decedent would have had no
claim for lost life. Accordingly, lost-life damages are unavailable
under true survival statutes.
At least one court considering this issue has reached the
145 These statutes are collected in MINzER, supma note 5, at ch. 29 (appendix on
statutes).
146 "[U]nder the survival statute the cause of action arises out of the injuty. The
injury may manifest itself in the loss of life instantly or subsequently, but the loss of life
is not what gives rise to the cause of action." Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Haw.
373, 383, 369 P.2d 96, 101 (1962) (emphasis added).
147 For a general discussion of the nature of a survival claim, see MINZER, supra note
5, at § 20.12; KEETON, supra note 22, at § 126; SPEIER, supra note 15, § 14:1. Several
states expressly impose this limitation by statute. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
41.100(3) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989) ("the damages . . . include all losses or damages
which the decedent incurred or sustained before his death"); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-3
(1987) ("the executor or administrator may recover all reasonable funeral and burial
expenses in addition to damages accrued during the lifetime of the deceased"); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUsT LAw § 11-3.3 (McKinney 1967) ("damages recoverable for such injury
are limited to those accruing before death and shall not include damages for or by
reason of death").
148 MINZER, supra note 5, § 20.12, at 20-26 ("A survival statute permits recovery by
the representatives of the deceased for damages the deceased could -have recovered had
he or she lived."); SPEISER, supra note 15, § 14:1, at 408 ("Survival statutes . . . permit
recovery by the decedent's personal representative . . . for damages which the decedent
could have recovered had he lived.").
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same conclusion, but not necessarily for the right reason. In
Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center,'49 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania disapproved a jury instruction which provided
that damages could be awarded under the state survival statute to
the father of a deceased five-year-old victim of medical malprac-
tice for "loss that may have been sustained as a result of the loss
of amenities or pleasures of life." 5 ' In support of its conclusion
that this instruction was erroneous, the court offered only the ipse
dixit that damages for the lost pleasure of life are improper be-
cause they are akin to damages for the loss of life itself, which
are also improper. The court failed to further justify its hold-
ing.15 1
The Pennsylvania survival statute would have been a better
basis for the Willinger decision. The statute provided that "any
right or liability which survives a decedent may be brought by ...
his personal representative . .. as though the decedent were
alive."152 The court could have denied damages for the lost plea-
sure of life based on this language. This would have been consis-
tent with the historical basis for survival actions-to provide only
for the continuation of a claim the decedent would have been
able to maintain had he not died. To recognize damages for loss
of the ability to enjoy the amenities of life would be contrary to
the statutory limitation that survival claims may be brought "as
though the decedent were alive." 5'
149 482 Pa. 441, 393 A.2d 1188 (1978).
150 Id. at 446, 393 A.2d at 1190.
151 The court stated:
We discern little or no distinction between seeking to calculate the value of
"life itself" and the value of experiencing life's pleasures. Were we to permit
compensation for loss of "life itself," undoubtedly this intangible item would
have to be measured in terms of the loss of those very opportunities to enjoy
family, work, and recreation the trial court directed the jury to consider in
measuring the loss of life's pleasures. Thus, to permit a jury to award damages
to the estate for the decedent's loss of life's pleasures in effect authorizes a
type of recovery expressly repudiated in IncoUlingo [v. Ewing.
Id. at 447, 393 A.2d at 1191. In Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 308, 282 A.2d 206,
229 (1971), the court had stated, without analysis, that: "It has never been the law in
Pennsylvania . .. to hold that the loss of life itself is compensable." See also Wooldridge
v. Woolett, 96 Wash. 2d 659, 638 P.2d 566 (1981) (rejecting damages for "shortened life
expectancy" under Washington survival statute).
152 Act of April 18, 1949 (P.L 512), § 603 (emphasis added) (current version at 20




2. Recovery Under Wrongful Death Statutes.
Unlike survival statutes, wrongful death statutes create a new
cause of action based upon the event of death. In most states,
however, the cause of action for wrongful death inures to the
decedent's survivors. Although often brought in the name of the
decedent's personal representative, the wrongful death action is
for the benefit of the statutorily designated survivors. The object
is to compensate survivors for the losses they suffer because of
the death of a loved one." The damages that are available-
lost pecuniary contributions of the decedent supplemented in
most states by damages for loss of society and/or mental an-
guish-correspond with this purpose.
The conceptual underpinning of wrongful death remedies in
these "loss-to-the-survivors" states presents an obstacle to the re-
covery of damages for the value of lost life. Since it is the dece-
dent who suffers the loss of life, damages for that loss do not
neatly comport with the theory of compensating the survivors for
their losses. This roadblock is diminished in the minority of states
that measure damages in death actions based upon the "loss to
the estate." But, as argued below, even in loss-to-the-survivors ju-
risdictions, courts should be willing to overlook this conceptual
difficulty when the state wrongful death statute can be construed
to allow damages for the value of lost life.
(a) Loss-to-the-Estate Jurisdictions.-There are four different
types of statutes under which damages, in whole or in part, are
measured by the loss to the decedent's estate, rather than by the
loss to the survivors:155 (1) hybrid survival-death statutes, which
are essentially survival actions enlarged by statute or judicial deci-
sion to include damages in the same action for wrongful
death; 58 (2) true wrongful death statutes, construed to measure
damages by loss to the estate;" 7 (3) wrongful death statutes
which measure damages by the loss to the survivors, except where
154 For general discussion of the nature of wrongful death claims, see KEETON, supra
note 22, § 127; MINZER, supm note 5, § 20.12; SPEISER, supra note 15, § 14:1.
155 See generally MINZER, supra note 5, § 23.00; SPEIsER, supra note 15, § 3:2.
156 Kg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 556:9, 556:12
(1974 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE §§ 611.20 and 633.336 (1989).
157 Fg. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-4-1, 51-4-2 (1982 & Supp. 1989), construed in Western
& A.R.R. Co. v. Michael, 175 Ga. 1, 10, 165 S.E. 37, 41 (1932) (measure of recovery is
full value of decedent's life regardless of its real value to the survivors).
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the decedent is not survived by any statutory beneficiary, in which
case damages are measured by the loss to the estate;158 and (4)
wrongful death statutes which measure damages by the loss to the
survivors, but allow the decedent's personal representative to re-
cover specified items of damages such as medical and funeral
expenses on behalf of the estate. 59
In practice, damage calculations in loss-to-the-estate jurisdic-
tions often resemble those in loss-to-the-survivors jurisdictions
because both methods focus primarily upon pecuniary losses re-
sulting from the decedent's death.' The critical difference be-
tween the two standards with respect to lost-life damages lies in
their theoretical underpinnings. As the label tells, in "loss-to-the-
estate" jurisdictions, the inquiry is directed towards assessing the
injury that the death has caused to the decedent's estate, not the
harm caused to the survivors. This allows room for arguing that
losses to the decedent's estate resulting from the death logically
should encompass all losses suffered by the decedent from the
death-including the value of his life.
So far, only Connecticut has construed its death remedy to
allow compensation for the value of lost life. The Connecticut
statute authorizes the decedent's personal representative to recov-
er "just damages" for injuries causing death.'6 ' Though recogniz-
ing that the statute is essentially a survival statute aimed at reme-
dying the injury to the decedent rather than to the survivors,, the
Connecticut Supreme Court has enlarged the statute to include
death damages as well.6 2 This hybrid approach has allowed the
court to recognize compensation not only for traditional survival
damages and pecuniary losses to the decedent's estate, but also
for "the destruction of ... [the decedent's] capacity to carry on
158 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-612 (1982 & Supp. 1988), construed in Salinas v.
Kahn, 2 Ariz. App. 181, 194, 407 P.2d 120, 133 (1965), reh'g denied and opinion modified,
2 Ariz. App. 348, 409 P.2d 64 (1965). Several states have provisions authorizing recovery
on behalf of the estate where no designated beneficiaries survive the decedent. See, e.g.,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (1978).
159 E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1981 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2922(6) (West 1989).
160 The most prevalent method for calculating pecuniary loss to the estate involves
determining the present value of the decedent's future net earnings; that is, probable
future earnings diminished by what the decedent would have spent for his own living
expenses, reduced to present value. This is quite similar to computing the amount the
decedent would have contributed to the survivors in loss-to-the-survivors states. See
SPEISER, sup note 15, § 3:62.
161 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 (1989).
162 Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 467, 45 A.2d 789, 791-92 (1946) (characteriz-
ing death as "one of the consequences of the wrong inflicted upon the decedent").
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and enjoy life's activities ... ."' Valuing the lost capacity to
enjoy life is equivalent to valuing life itself.64
The wrongful death statutes of other loss-to-the-estate states
are also amenable to damage awards for the value of lost life,
though most would require judicial reconstruction jettisoning
pecuniary loss as the principal measure of damages. The Georgia
wrongful death statute, for example, authorizes recovery for "the
full value of the life of the decedent,"6 5 which could reasonably
be interpreted to include the value of life itself.'66 The language
of Kentucky's wrongful death statute also furnishes a strong basis
for damages for lost life, providing that "damages may be recov-
ered for the death from the person who caused it . .. 7 Dam-
ages "for the death" could be read to mean damages for the
death itself, and not merely damages for the pecuniary injury to
the estate resulting from death.168 Likewise, the statutes of New
Hampshire, Iowa and New Mexico are subject to a construction
allowing damages for the value of lost life. 9 Among the loss-to-
the-estate states, only the Tennessee statute appears to absolutely
preclude the recovery of hedonic damages.
v9
(b) Loss-to-the-Survivors Jurisdictions.-Like the statutes of most
163 Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 657, 368 A.2d 172, 183 (1976).
164 Cf. Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 441, 447, 393 A.2d 1188,
1191 (1978) (in rejecting damages for loss of life's pleasures, the court, having previously
rejected compensation for the loss of life itself, stated: "We discern little or no distinc-
tion between seeking to calculate the value of 'life itself' and the value of experiencing
life's pleasures.").
165 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-2 (Supp. 1988).
166 The.Georgia Supreme Court would have to be persuaded to modify prior law
confining recovery under its statute to pecuniary, loss. Bulloch County Hosp. Auth. v.
Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 242, 248, 183 S.E.2d 586, 591 (1971) (overruled by Gilson v
Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321, 205 S.E.2d 421 (1974), aftd, 233 Ga. 453, 211 S.E.2d 744
(1975)).
167 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1988)
(emphasis added).
168 Current Kentucky law measures damages by the loss to the estate resulting from
the destruction of the decedents power to earn money. Department of Educ. v. Blevins,
707 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Ky. 1986); Wilkins v. Hopkins, 278 Ky. 280, 287, 128 S.W.2d 772,
775 (1939).
169 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:12 (1974 & Supp. 1989) (including as an "element"
of damages "the probable duration of. . . [the decedent's] life but for the injury");
IOWA CODE §§ 611.20, 633.336 (1989) (no express limitation upon the damages to be
recovered); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (1978) (provides for "fair and just" damages "tak-
ing into consideration" pecuniary losses).
170 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-113 (1980 & Supp. 1989) (sets forth an exclusive list of
elements of recoverable damages, which does not include damages for lost life).
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of the loss-to-the-estate jurisdictions, the wrongful death statutes in
many of the loss-to-the-survivors states are subject to a construc-
tion allowing damages for the value of lost life. However, since
the history of these statutes clearly establishes that their purpose
is to compensate the decedent's survivors for their own losses, a
successful claim for lost-life damages depends upon a judicial
willingness to reconstruct the wrongful death statute.
Wrongful death statutes in loss-to-the-survivors jurisdictions
come in five basic varieties with respect to the damages that are
available: (1) those providing only in general terms for fair and
just damages;' 7 ' (2) those including a nonexclusive list of avail-
able types of damages; 7 2 (3) those including an exclusive list of
available types of damages; 17 (4) those specifically limiting dam-
ages to pecuniary losses of the survivors;'7 4 and (5) those which
otherwise make clear that the damages are for injuries suffered by
the survivors because of the death. 5 Statutes falling into the
171 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1990) ("such damages may be given as under all the
circumstances of the case as may be just"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1990)
("such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the
damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all
parties interested in the suit"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-323 (1988) ("such damages may
be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just"); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-11-7 (1987) ("such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case
may be just").
172 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1990) ("damages shall be
in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not
limited to [listing items of damages]"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922(6) (1986) ("the
court or jury may award damages as the court or jury shall consider fair and equitable,
under all the circumstances, including [list of items of damages]"); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-52 (1984) ("The verdict or judgment . . . shall include, but may not be limited to,
damages for the following- [list of items of damages]."); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1981 &
Supp. 1990) ("The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages
for the following [list of items of damages].").
173 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B)
(Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West 1988).
174 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 1 2 (1989) ("fair and just compensation with refer-
ence to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and
next of kin of such deceased person"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b) (1981
& Supp. 1990) ("fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries
resulting from such death to the person for whose benefit the action is brought"); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) ("Judgment for damages for pecuniary
injury from wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled to bring a wrongful
death action."); WYo. STAT. § 1-38-102 (1988) ("such damages, pecuniary and exemplary,
as shall be deemed fair and just").
175 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-613 (1982) ("jury shall give such damages as it
deems fair and just with reference to the injury resulting from the death to the surviv-
ing parties who may be entitled to recover"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (Supp. 1990)
("jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just, with reference to the
necessary injury resulting from such death.. . to the surviving parties who may be
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first two groups do not preclude judicial recognition of damages
for the value of lost life; whereas those falling within the last
three categories do.
Among the statutes falling in the first two groups, some are
more susceptible to a construction allowing recovery for lost-life
damages than others. For example, the Mississippi wrongful death
statute furnishes a basis for a strong argument in favor of lost-life
damages by providing for recovery of "such damages as the jury
may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages
of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any
and all parties interested in the suit." 7' Loss of life is certainly
a kind of damage to the decedent. Similarly, the Pennsylvania
wrongful death statute provides that "[a]n action may be
brought... to recover damages for the death of an individual
caused by [a] wrongful act."'77 "Damages for the death" could
be construed to include damages for the loss of life." 8
It will no doubt take a bold and progressive court to recon-
struct such a wrongful death statute to allow recovery for lost-life
damages. In addition to the general objections to such awards ad-
dressed- in Part II of this Article,'79 proponents of lost-life dam-
ages will have to overcome the argument that the only appropri-
ate damages under wrongful death statutes are those intended to
compensate the survivors for their losses, which do not include
damages for the value of the decedent's life. As noted, this prob-
lem is minimized in states that measure wrongful death damages
by the loss resulting to the estate, rather than by the loss to the
survivors. Compensating the decedent's estate for all losses inflict-
ed by the wrongful death could logically include compensation for
the decedent's loss of life itself.
However, this conceptual obstacle should not be insurmount-
able even in loss-to-the-survivors jurisdictions. Decisions in wrong-
ful death cases demonstrate that judges and juries recognize that
human life has value beyond pecuniary loss and often manipulate
entitled to sue"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-810 (1989) ("The verdict or judgment should be
for the amount of damages which the persons in whose behalf the action is brought
have sustained.").
176 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
177 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
178 But see Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 441, 446, 393 A.2d
1188, 1190 (1978) (rejecting lost-life damages under Pennsylvania survival statute on the
basis that loss of life has never been compensable in Pennsylvania).
179 See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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the rule to reflect this recognition. 80 The harder judges and ju-
ries strain to get around the pecuniary loss limitations on wrong-
ful death damages, the stronger the justification for modifying the
law.
The history of tort law is rife with instances where judges
have acted to harmonize the written law with the reality of law.
Justice Traynor's watershed concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,' where he urged adoption of strict
liability in tort for injuries caused by defective products, criticized
the "fictions" developed by courts to achieve the same result.18 2
The Florida Supreme Court, considering whether to recognize
intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort,
took note of the "strong current of opinion" that such action was
warranted "in lieu of the strained reasoning so often apparent
when liability for such injury is predicated upon one or another
of several traditional tort theories." 8 ' Courts have an obligation
to correct the law to keep it in step with how it is being applied
in practice. This is such a case.
Courts should not feel overly constrained by either the con-
ceptual difficulty of allowing survivors to recover for the loss of
the decedent's life, or by prior interpretations of their wrongful
death statutes. As for the conceptual problem, the Supreme Court
of California was correct when, in holding that comparative fault
principles apply to strict liability claims for defective products, it
rejected conceptual and semantic consistency in favor of "the
attainment of a just and equitable result."'84 Similarly, with re-
180 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
181 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
182 Id. at 463-68, 150 P.2d at 440-44 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor's view
prevailed in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963), where he indicated that the court was simply making explicit what had
been implicit since the recognition of implied warranties and abandonment of the privity
limitation in warranty actions:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recogni-
tion that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the
refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility
for defective products ...make dear that the liability is not one governed by
the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
I& at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
183 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1958).
184 Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978). Conceptually and semantically; comparative fault principles
should have no application to claims predicated upon strict liability because there is no
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gard to the effect of road-blocking precedent, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reasoned in abrogating the doctrine of local gov-
ernmental immunity: "The controlling principle which emerg-
es . .. is clear-the doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for
perpetuating error, but rather a legal concept that responds to
the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth
processes of the law to flourish."" 5
There is no inconsistency in awarding to the survivors of the
deceased the value of his lost life in addition to their own losses.
The loss has occurred, the defendant has inflicted it and the de-
terrence rationale and principles of symbolic justice warrant
awarding damages for it. The survivors are logical recipients of
these damages. The difference between awarding the damages to
the survivors as opposed to the estate of the decedent is simply
one of form. Some courts undoubtedly will feel this is a matter
appropriately left to the legislature, and that may well be the
preferable course. Wrongful death statutes could easily be amend-
ed to authorize lost-life damages. Precisely how this should be
accomplished is discussed in Part IV."s6
IV. VALUING HUMAN LIFE
It is time to revisit the opening sentence of this Article:
"What is a human life worth?" Once one determines that life has
a hedonic value which is improperly ignored under current dam-
ages rules in wrongful death cases, the inevitable question is how
that value should be fixed. One response might be that since life
is priceless, any effort to value life denigrates its sanctity by equat-
ing human life with ordinary commodities. Nevertheless, while
such a response may be appealing from a moral standpoint, it
ignores reality. In wrongful death actions, we do not have the
luxury of simply saying that life is too precious to be valued; in-
stead, we treat it as worthless. The law recognizes a right to re-
covery when a defendant wrongfully takes the life of another.
Having critiqued the existing method for valuing that life (i.e., the
pecuniary loss rule), the purpose of this Part is to consider alter-
fault on the defendant's side against which to compare the plaintiff's fault.
185 Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 606, 305 A.2d 877, 888
(1973) (superseded by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-64 (1978)). See also Barden v. North-
ern Pac. R. Co., 154 U.S. 288, 321 (1894) ("It is more important that the court should
be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with
previous declarations.").
186 See infra notes 217-48 and accompanying text.
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natives.
Perhaps surprising to some, the development of methodolo-
gies to place a value on human life is not a new science. Econo-
mists have written reams about the issue, principally with refer-
ence to the costs and benefits of risk reduction in the work and
market places. They have come up with-two basic approaches for
valuing human life: the human capital approach and the willing-
ness-to-pay approach. Federal agencies employ these methods on a
regular basis in their efforts to comply with the Reagan
Administration's executive order requiring agencies to weigh the
costs and benefits of new safety regulations."8 7 Both approaches
were developed to value life ex ante-before it is lost. For reasons
set forth below, neither is satisfactory for use in tort actions.
A. Human Capital Approach
The human capital approach parallels the pecuniary loss rule
used in wrongful death cases, and thus, suffers from the same
defects. This method measures the value of life by calculating
what the death of the person has cost society in terms of lost
economic productivity."8 ' It equates lost human economic pro-
ductivity with the loss of goods that would result from the prema-
ture destruction of productive physical capital. Specifically, the
human capital approach measures the value of human life by the
amount of lost future earnings discounted to present value.' 9
In light of what has been said about the pecuniary loss rule,
no extended discussion of the deficiencies in the human capital
approach is necessary. By focusing only upon the loss to the na-
tional income, the human capital approach, like its cousin the
pecuniary loss rule,' systematically undervalues life by failing
to take into account variables such as the pleasure of living and
the desire to live.'' People live for reasons other than econom-
187 See supra note 3. An excellent analysis of this agency process is found in C.
GILLETTE & T. HOPKINS, FEDERAL AGENCY VALUATIONS OF HUMAN LIFE: A REPORT TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 1988) (unpublished).
188 Id. at 34.
189 Linnerooth, The Value of Human Life: A Review of the Models, 17 EcoN. INQUIRY
52 (1979).
190 See supra notes 11-33 and accompanying text.
191 "The obvious weakness of this approach is that it measures only the economic
importance of an individual to society. It excludes the emotional value of an individual
to himself and to those around him, which surely can be a substantial consideration."




ic production. The extrajudicial reasoning offered by a federal
district judge in support of his decision to allow hedonic damages
to go to the jury in Sheirod v. Beny'9 2 is revealing. He told a re-
porter after the trial that he found hedonic damages "appropriate
because I, know enough about life to know it's enjoyable." 9 '
One would be hard-pressed to disagree.
Also like the pecuniary loss rule, 94 the human capital ap-
proach discriminates against groups of low- or no-wage earners
such as women, minorities, minors and the elderly.'95 We may
not all be commensurate as money-making machines, but it is
doubtful anyone would concede that his life is worth less than his
banker's merely because the banker is more economically produc-
tive. Indeed, many of the great figures in history-artists, writers,
composers-would be worth little under the human capital ap-
proach. Though productive as enrichers and experiencers of life,
they did little to boost the gross national product in their day.
About the only thing to be said in favor of the human capital
approach is that, like the pecuniary loss rule, 9 6 it can be ap-
plied with relative ease because of the availability of data on earn-
ings. As economist E.J. Mishan observed: "Recourse to [the hu-
man capital approach] by the practicing economist does not ...
rest on the clear recognition of the desirability of maximizing
GNP but rather, obviously on the fact that it lends itself easily to
quantification. "
197
Administrative convenience is not a sufficient justification for
retaining what are otherwise unsound and incomplete approaches
to valuing human life. As Mishan commented in another work,
"there is more to be said for rough estimates of the precise con-
cept than precise estimates of economically irrelevant con-
cepts."198 Valuing life based upon lost economic productivity,
192 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. I1. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) (en banc).
193 Tapp, supm note 36, at 1, col. 6 (quoting Honorable George N. Leighton).
194 See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
195 "This method is criticized because it sets low values for the lives of the poor,
handicapped, and elderly." Tafler, Cost-Benefit Analysis Proves a Tough Task, HIGH TECH.,
July/Aug. 1982, at 76.
196 But see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for discussion of problems
involved in calculating pecuniary losses.
197 E.J. MIsHAN, CosT-BE-NEF T ANALYSlS" 156 (1971). See also Cook, The Value of
Human Life in the Demand for Safety: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 710 (1978) (author
offers ease of application as the explanation for continued use of the human capital ap-
proach).
198 Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687,
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while perhaps not irrelevant, is incomplete and therefore inade-
quate as a basis for calculating damages in wrongful death ac-
tions.
B. Willingness-To-Pay Approach
The valuation approach most highly touted for including the
full value of human life in wrongful death actions is the willing-
ness-to-pay method.'99 This is the approach economist Stanley
Smith successfully employed to persuade the jury to award
$850,000 in hedonic damages to the plaintiff in Sherrod.
Cast in its simplest form, the value of a human life under the
willingness-to-pay approach "is the amount members of society are
willing to pay to save one."2"' This can be determined, so the
theory holds, by analyzing either production or consumption be-
havior with respect to risk reduction or avoidance. Most willing-
ness-to-pay studies examine the production behavior of people in
terms of their willingness to be exposed to risks of fatality in the
workplace. Life values are determined by analyzing wage premi-
ums paid to workers in high-risk industries." 1 The idea is that
the value workers place on their own lives can be determined by
looking at how much of a wage premium they demand to work
in enterprises that expose them to enhanced risks of fatality. It is
not a completely new idea. Adam Smith suggested two hundred
years ago that workers must be induced to take risky jobs by
receiving higher pay for them.20 2
Some willingness-to-pay studies are based upon observed con-
sumption behavior rather than production behavior. Here, the
question is what a person will voluntarily pay to reduce or avoid
a particular risk of death.20 3 Assume, for example, there are two
705 (1971).
199 The basic theory was derived from a 1968 article by Thomas Schelling. Schelling,
The Life You Save May Be Your Own, reprinted in T. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSE-
QUENCE 113 (1984). Detailed discussion of the economic analyses involved in applying
the willingness-to-pay approach is beyond the scope of this article. Those interested in
the methodologies employed should consult the works cited herein.
200 Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in
MARKET AND NONMARKET ASPECTS OF REAL EARNINGS 265 (National Bureau of Econom-
ic Research 1973).
201 E.g., Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs,
16 J. HUM. RESOURCES 167 (1981) (concluding that the estimated value of a life implied
by the risk premium paid to workers in dangerous jobs is $3.2 million).
202 Thaler & Rosen, supra note 200, at 266.
203 E.g., Blomquist, Value of Life Saving: Implications of Consumer Activity, 87 J. POL.
ECON. 540 (1979) (by analyzing automobile seatbelt use, author arrives at a value of
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products that are identical except that one of them has a safety
feature that the other lacks. Assume further that the product with
the safety feature costs ten dollars more than the one without the
safety feature. Finally, assume it can be calculated that this safety
feature will reduce the probability of death resulting from use of
the product from ten in a million to five in a million. If a con-
sumer voluntarily purchases the product with the safety feature
for ten dollars more, the implied value of his life from his ob-
served consumptive behavior can be computed as follows:
$10/.000005 = $2 million.20 4
The theoretical advantage of the willingness-to-pay model is
that it takes into account the intrinsic value of life which is ig-
nored by the human capital approach and the pecuniary loss rule.
It assumes that individuals take into account their enjoyment of
life when they make employment or consumption decisions that
will expose them to a risk of dying. Another advantage is that,
because the willingness-to-pay approach involves an objective anal-
ysis of market data rather than a subjective analysis of the particu-
lar victim's life,205 application of the approach in wrongful death
actions would avoid the discriminatory effect of the human capital
and pecuniary loss approaches. All lives, be they bankers' or facto-
ry workers', are worth the same under a willingness-to-pay ap-
proach.
Hence, the willingness-to-pay model theoretically has great
potential in wrongful death cases to assist the fact finder in at-
taching a complete value to the decedent's life. However, the
validity of the willingness-to-pay theory depends upon assumptions
that people have freedom of choice in deciding whether to con-
$370,000 per human life).
204 See C. GILLETTE & T. HOPKINS, supra note 187, at 41-42. Some willingness-to-pay
studies are based upon hypothetical rather than observed behavior. These studies rely
upon questionnaires that ask consumers how much they would be willing to pay for
safety measures that would reduce a particular risk, or how much they would require as
compensation for increased risks. For discussion of the questionnaire method, see Jones-
Lee, Hammerton & Philips, The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95
EcoN. J. 49 (1985). The principal advantage of the questionnaire method is that the
survey can be tailored to obtain precisely the information sought. Id. at 51. By contrast,
it is difficult to isolate the wealth/risk tradeoff with respect to observed behavior be-
cause so many other factors influence consumer decisions. Id. The major disadvantage of
the questionnaire method, however, is that it deals with hypothetical rather than real life
choices. Id.
205 Stanley Smith, the economist who testified in the Sherrod case, told the Wall
Street Journal that he does not study the particular joys and sorrows of the victim. "I'm
not an expert on any one person's pleasures," he said. Barrett, supra note 36, at A-4,
col. 1.
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front risks, and that they perceive those risks accurately."°' Un-
fortunately, both of these assumptions are probably false.
Most willingness-to-pay studies attempt to value human life by
looking at the relationship between risky jobs and the wages paid
to workers in those jobs.217 These studies necessarily assume
that workers in high-risk industries choose to be exposed to those
risks in order to receive a wage premium. This, in turn, requires
the broader assumption that people accept particular jobs out of
free choice, rather than because of external factors. This is a du-
bious proposition. Diverse barriers-geographic, educational, lan-
guage and racial, to name but a few-preclude free choice in em-
ployment decisions for many groups of people. For example, we
cannot say that residents of Appalachian coal mining regions free-
ly choose to be exposed to the risks of coal mining in return for
a wage risk-premium. For many, coal mining is the only choice
because of their lack of mobility.
Even if one were to assume that workers have the mobility
necessary to make truly voluntary job choices, the willingness-to-
pay theory still fails unless it can also be shown that the workers
fully understand the hazards involved. This is also true of willing-
ness-to-pay studies that focus upon consumptive behavior. One
cannot express a preference to be exposed to a particular risk
unless one knows and appreciates the risk. This requires that one
accurately perceive both the probability that the risk will material-
ize and the losses that will occur if it does.2  This is rarely the
case.
Professors Gillette and Hopkins note that appreciation of the
risk is particularly unlikely for "single- or infrequent-play play-
ers,"2 9 that is, individuals who will not confront the risk on a
regular basis. Consumers are unlikely to exert the effort necessary
to acquire information about the risks involved with many kinds
of products because the search for that information is too costly
given the infrequent use of the product.2 0 Repeat play-
ers-usually workers-are more likely to acquire information re-
garding risks that they will regularly encounter, but they may not
acquire this information until after spending some time on the
206 See Linnerooth, supra note 189, at 53.
207 See Blomquist, The Value of Human Life: An Empirical Perspective, 19 ECON. INQUI-
RY 157 (1981) (discussing numerous studies).
208 C. GILLETrE & T. HOPKINS, supra note 187, at 43-44.




job. By then, other practicalities may influence the worker's deci-
sion to stay in that occupation. This calls into question whether
the worker is exposing herself to the risk as a matter of prefer-
ence. The worker may have moved her family to the location to
take the job; her financial obligations may have grown commensu-
rate to her higher earnings, locking the worker into the job; or
the worker may not want to admit to herself that she made a bad
decision.
The most basic flaw in the willingness-to-pay theory, however,
is that it simply does not comport with the reality of how people
behave. The truth is that we often fail to avoid risks even when
they involve little cost. This is probably because we believe in our
own immortality, sharing a kind of "that only happens to other
people" mentality. Presumably, most drivers know that the failure
to wear a seatbelt substantially increases their chances of dying in
a serious auto accident, yet most drivers still do not wear seatbel-
ts.2 ' Does their failure to accept a small inconvenience to avoid1
a significant risk of death mean that people do not value their
lives highly,212 or does it mean only that, regardless of the exis-
tence of the risk, they do not think it will happen to them?
People accept risks not because they are willing to gamble on
losing their lives in order to save or make a little money, but
because they do not think the risk will ever materialize. To permit
a realistic appraisal of a person's willingness to trade risk for
wealth, we would have to confront the person with a known,
substantial and imminent risk of death. For example, how much
would a person demand to play Russian Roulette with a six-cham-
ber revolver loaded with one bullet? The risk is easily computed
as a one-in-six chance of death. To know the amount people
would demand to confront this risk would allow us to calculate
with accuracy the value people attach to their lives. We can pre-
dict with confidence that the amounts would be tremendous, and
211 As Machol notes:
It is well known ... that about one American in 5,000 will die each year in
automobile accidents, and many more will be severely injured; yet people rou-'
tinely accept this hazard by traveling in autos (and even frequently refuse to
reduce it by the simple expedient of fastening seat belts). It is equally well
known that people will not generally spend a large amount of money to reduce
an already small probability of death-for example, very few Americans were
willing to spend a few hundred dollars extra to buy air bags for their cars.
Machol, How Muck Safety?, 16 INTERFACES 50, 54 (1986).
212 Blomquist's study of seatbelt use came up with a life valuation of only $370,000
per life. Blomquist, supra note 203, at 540.
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that they probably would not vary widely between those who wear
seat belts and those who do not.
Calculations of life values from willingness-to-pay studies vary
wildly, even though they convey an aura of reliability. Economist
Glenn Blomquist's 1981 article surveying nine studies reveals a
range from $50,000 to $8.9 million per life.21 Although they do
not always reveal their methodologies, federal agencies have set
life values as low as $70,000 and as high as $132 million per
life.214 Figures provided by hedonic damages expert Stanley
Smith vary from $66,000 to $11.8 million per life.215
Given the flaws of the willingness-to-pay theory and the wide-
ranging values it generates, the extent to which willingness-to-pay
evidence meaningfully assists a jury in calculating damages for the
intrinsic value of life is suspect at best. The fact is that there is
no reliable way to evaluate the intrinsic value of a person's life.
As discussed above,216 this is not a sufficient reason to refuse to
attach a value to life, but it does cali for a different approach.
C. English Law and a Proposed Legislative Solution
English courts have long awarded damages for what they
termed the "loss of expectation of life." 217 The first case recog-
nizing such a recovery was Flint v. Lovell,21s where the trial
court awarded £4,000 to a seventy-year-old man injured in an
auto accident, based upon the judge's conclusion that he had
"lost the prospect of an enjoyable, vigorous and happy old age
which I am satisfied on the medical testimony might have gone
on for a number of years if this unhappy accident had not oc-
curred."2 19 The evidence showed the accident reduced the plain-
tiff's life expectancy by eight or nine years.220
In Rose v. Ford,221 the House of Lords extended the reason-
ing of Flint to a wrongful death situation, holding that the right
213 Blomquist, supra note 207, at 158.
214 C. GILLETTE & T. HOPKINS, supra note 187, at 2. The $70,000 figure was set in
1980 in connection with a Consumer Product Safety Commission regulation governing
space heaters. The $132 million value came from a 1979 regulation by the Food and
Drug Administration banning DES in cattle feed. Id.
215 Barrett, supra note 36, at A-4, col. 2-3.
216 See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
217 See generally Note, Damages for Lost Years, 97 L.Q. REv. 353 (1981).
218 [1935] 1 K.B. 354.
219 Id. at 355.
220 Id. at 357.
221 [1937] App. Cas. 826.
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to recover damages for the loss' of expectation of life passes upon
death to the decedent's personal representative. 222 However, the
House of Lords avoided the issue of how such damages should be
measured, stating only that "[h]ow the damages are to be calculat-
ed is a question which this House has not 'to decide, for there
has been no quarrel with the amount fixed by the Court of Ap-
peal in this case of £1,000. " 22s
The House of Lords grappled, quite unsatisfactorily, with the
valuation issue in Benham v. Gambling.224 The trial court award-
ed £1,200 for the loss of expectation of life of a two-and-one-half-
year-old child, which the court of appeals affirmed. The House of
Lords ruled that £1,200 was an excessive award for a child's lost
expectation of life, and reduced the award to £200.225 Viscount
Simon's opinion for the House of Lords recognized that the
Lords were faced with "the difficult task of indicating what are
the main considerations to be borne in mind in assessing damag-
es" for loss of the expectation of life.226 Unfortunately, the opin-
ion did little more than eliminate certain factors from consider-
ation, and in the end offered only an amorphous general princi-
ple as a standard. The House of Lords began by opining that the
victim's life expectancy, while of some relevance, was not of pri-
mary importance in measuring damages:
[T]he thing to be valued is not the prospect of length of days,
but the prospect of a predominantly happy life .... It would
be fallacious to assume, for this purpose, that all human life is
continuously an enjoyable thing, so that the shortening of it
calls for compensation, to be paid to the deceased's estate, on
a quantitative basis. The ups and downs of life, its pains and
sorrows as well as its joys and pleasures-all that makes up
"life's fitful fever"-have to be allowed for in the estimate. In
222 Lord Atkin, concurring in the unanimous judgment of the House of Lords,
explained the decision as follows:
I am of opinion, therefore, that a living person can claim damages for loss of
expectation of life. If he can I think that right is vested in him in life, and on
his death passes under the Act of 1934 to his personal representative. I do not
see any reason why the fact that the expectation is realized, i.e., that death
comes at the time anticipated, or sooner, should make any difference.
Id. at 834. These damages are separate from damages recoverable by the survivors of the
decedent in their own right. Id. at 835.
223 Id. at 834.
224 [1941] App. Cas. 157.
225 Id. at 168.
226 Id. at 165.
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assessing damages for shortening of life, therefore, such dam-
ages should not be calculated solely, or even mainly, on the
basis of the length of life which is lost.2
Instead, the question "resolves itself into that of fixing a rea-
sonable figure to be paid by way of damages for the loss of a
measure of prospective happiness."228 This requires a determi-
nation of what the victim's prospects for happiness were prior to
death.229 The claim on behalf of the child victim in Benham
failed on this count. Viscount Simon believed that because of her
immaturity, "there [was] necessarily so much uncertainty about
the child's future that no confident estimate of prospective happi-
ness [could] be made."2 0 Based upon this, the House of Lords
agreed that £200 was a proper figure for lost-expectation-of-life
damages.8 1 In doing so, it emphasized that because a dead per-
son cannot be compensated and because putting a money value
on lost life necessitates an effort to "equate incommensurables,"
damages in all such cases should be "very moderate." 23 2 Strange-
ly, after offering this general guidance, the House of Lords acted
as if it had instilled great certainty into the damage calculation
process, confidently stating it was "approving a standard of mea-
surement which, had it been applied in [earlier] cases, would have
led . . . to reduced awards."288
After Benham, English courts began awarding nominal, stan-
dardized sums for lost expectation of life. Thus, in Gammell v.
Wilson,2 34 the court of appeals held that an award of £1,250 was
proper for a decedent's lost expectation of life in all cases, to be
changed only to take account of inflation. The court reasoned as
follows:
This figure has to be a conventional figure. It is impor-
tant that there should be uniformity. Accordingly, when the
question of the amount is raised in this court, we must do our
227 Id. at 166.
228 Id. The House of Lords stated that lost future earnings play no part in calculat-
ing damages for loss of expectation of life because wealth does not contribute to human
happiness. Id. at 167.
229 Id at 166-67. If evidence shows that the person was destined for a life of unhap-
piness, then no damages, or at least much smaller damages, should be awarded. Id. at
167.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 168. The House of Lords commented that "even this amount would be
excessive if it were not that the circumstances of the infant were most favourable." Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 [1980] 2 All E.R. 557 (C.A.).
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best to give guidance. It is not one of those cases where this
court can properly say: "This is a matter for the trial judge.
We will not interfere."2
-5
.
The law has since changed in England. In the appeal of
Gammell, the House of Lords expressed dissatisfaction with dam-
ages for the lost expectation of life and called upon Parliament to
take action to clarify the amount of damages that should be
awarded in wrongful death cases. 2 6 In the Administration of
Justice Act of 1982, Parliament responded to this call and abol-
ished damages for lost expectation of life. 3
While the haphazard development of English law in this area
is not something to be emulated, the English approach of fixing
an arbitrary sum to be awarded for lost life is a fitting one, which
should be adopted in this country by legislation. Endorsement of
this approach is demanded by two indisputable premises: (1) life
has a substantial intrinsic value, which is currently ignored by
positive law in American death cases; and (2) there is no way of
calculating this value in any meaningful way.
Acceptance of the second premise does not defeat the force
of the first one. The argument that damages for the lost value of
life are too speculative has already been addressed in this Arti-
cle. 3 When a tortfeasor wrongfully takes a life, an injury has
occurred which warrants compensation, whether for deterrent
purposes3 9 or for symbolic justice.2 40
The deterrence theory works only if the tortfeasor is required
to pay the full costs of his injury-causing activity.241 Otherwise,
the actor will lack adequate incentive to invest in safer behavior.
Failure to attach value to human life undermines the deterrence
model because the tort system does not account for the full cost
of injury.
The author believes that the general deterrence model of tort
law works, though only in a "rough and ready way." 242 No
235 Id. at 568.
236 Gammell v. Wilson, [1982] App. Cas. 27, 74.
237 Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § 1(1). The Act provides that the
decedent's awareness of impending death be considered as an element of pain and
suffering. Id.
238 See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
242 "The difficulty of calculating social costs, of evaluating non-economic costs and
benefits, [and] of allocating different costs to different activities ... are such that
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doubt, any effort at computing an economically efficient value to
human life in order to achieve optimalization of the number of
wrongful deaths would be imperfect at best. But imperfect as
compared to what? Concededly, the cost of a life cannot be math-
ematically determined for. the purpose of inserting it into an eco-
nomic formula, but the general proposition remains that certain
and severe sanctions would give actors a strong disincentive to
engage in unsafe behavior that presents a risk of death. Deter-
rence would be furthered if would-be tortfeasors knew that in
every case the consequence of wrongfully taking another's life
would be exacting. This has long been a fundamental emphasis of
deterrence literature. 43
To accomplish such deterrence, state legislatures should pass
statutes providing for a substantial, fixed, minimum award in
wrongful death cases. This amount need not represent society's
determination of the actual value of human life, because human
life is indeed priceless. Instead, it would represent the less pro-
found recognition that life is valuable and that a substantial cost
should be imposed on those who wrongfully take it away.
The wrongful death statute of one state, Rhode Island, fur-
nishes a workable model. Rhode Island has statutory provisions
providing for the award of pecuniary losses 244 and loss of
spousal or parental society and companionship 245 in wrongful
death actions. In addition, a separate section provides: "Whenever
any person or corporation is found liable under §§ 10-7-1 [to] 10-
74, inclusive, he or she or it shall be liable in damages in the sum of
not less than one hundred thousand dollars ($10,000)." 246 This sec-
tion implicitly recognizes that life has intrinsic value apart from
the economic contributions and society that the decedent's survi-
vors will lose as a result of the death; even if other cognizable
losses are missing, this statute recognizes that life has value.
The Rhode Island statute offers a simple means of solving a
complex problem. States could rectify the current deficiency in
their wrongful death remedies simply by adding a section provid-
ing for a minimum recovery in all death actions, thus providing
general deterrence can usually only operate in a rough and ready way at best." P.S.
ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 612 (3d ed. 1980).
243 See, e.g., Geerken & Cove, Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 497, 498-99 (1975); Grasmick & Bryjack, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived
Severity of Punishment, 59 Soc. FoRCES 471, 485, 486 (1980).
244 RI. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.1 (Supp. 1990).
245 R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-7-1.2 (1985).
246 RI. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
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recovery for the value of lost life. Such a statute would set a dam-
age floor. The statute would become operative when pecuniary
and other recognized elements of damages' do not exceed the
minimum recovery amount. The following model could be used:
Wrongful death-minimum recovey.
In every wrongful death action in which the plaintiff is
the prevailing party, the plaintiffs recovery shall be in an
amount not less than $_.
The amount of this minimum recovery should be determined
by the legislatures of each state. The amount should be substan-
tial enough both to promote deterrence and to symbolically dem-
onstrate the state's commitment to human life. Whatever amount
is adopted, legislatures should, of course, be cognizant of the
necessity of increasing it as inflation takes its toll on the value of
money.
As stated, the amount need not be looked upon as establish-
ing what the elected representatives of the state believe life to be
worth. The fact that State A sets its minimum recovery. at $100,-
000 and State B establishes the amount to be $500,000 does not
mean that State A does not value life as much as State B. Moral
and philosophical concerns regarding this could be dealt with by
an accompanying declaration of legislative purpose along the fol-
lowing lines:
Declaration of Purpose.
It is the view of the legislature that human life is priceless
in that each life is unique and can never be replaced. The
current method of awarding damages for the tortious taking of
a life in this state is inadequate because it fails to recognize
that the. life itself has any value. This statute cures that defi-
ciency by recognizing that in- all wrongful death cases, regard-
less of the plaintiff's ability to prove pecuniary or other losses,
there shall be a minimum recovery in an amount set by the
statute. This does not represent the view of the legislature that
a human life is worth only that amount. As stated, human life
is priceless. Instead, the minimum recovery serves the purpose
of deterring tortious conduct likely to result in death, while at
the same time demonstrating the state's dedication to the prin-
ciple that all lives have intrinsic value.
Broader or more elaborate statutory schemes are possible.
Statutes could, for example, set different recovery values depend-
ing upon the age of the victim. An argument could be made that
a child's life is worth more than the life of an adult because of
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the larger quantity of life taken away. A reverse argument, howev-
er, is that a child's prospects are less certain than an adult's be-
cause a child must face the risks and uncertainties of child-
hood.247 This fact arguably justifies larger awards for adults than
for children. To avoid these questions, as well as the moral dilem-
ma of making relative life value determinations, a single sum
applicable to all seems preferable.
States might also choose to allow recovery for the lost value
of life as an extra element of damages, to be added to other
damages such as pecuniary losses. Under the proposed minimum
recovery solution, if the amount of pecuniary and other damages
exceeds the minimum statutory amount, the statute would have
no effect. To come closer to achieving full valuation of the losses
from death, it would be desirable to treat the recovery for lost
life as an additional amount. However, in the current tort reform
climate it is unlikely that most state legislatures could be persuad-
ed to adopt an approach that would increase what some already
consider to be outrageous tort awards. The minimum recovery
statute is sufficient to further the deterrent function of tort law,
while also serving the principle of symbolic justice. Providing for
a substantial minimum recovery in all cases where liability is es-
tablished would significantly diminish the discriminatory impact of
the pecuniary loss rule.
Rather than prescribe a minimum amount, states might opt
for a statute that merely authorizes lost-life damages as a recover-
able element of damages, leaving to juries the task of determining
the proper amount. Letting the jury decide whether to award
such damages and in what amount would lack the certainty of
sanction inherent in a minimum recovery statute. Nonetheless,
because juries could be expected to award amounts substantially
higher than states would be willing to set as minimum recoveries,
this approach probably would have a greater deterrent impact.
Indeed, the impact may be too great. Just as a failure to include a
loss can distort the deterrence model, so can valuing it too highly.
247 The English courts made a similar argument in justifying a lower award for a
child's lost expectation of life:
When an individual has reached an age to have settled prospects, having passed
the risks and uncertainties of childhood, and having in some degree attained to
an established character and to firmer hopes, his or her future becomes more
definite, and the extent to which good fortune may probably attend him at any
rate becomes less incalculable.
Benham v. Gambling, [1941] 1 All E.R. 7, 13.
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Overdeterrence may result.248 . Given the speculative nature of
valuing human life and the danger that jurors, conditioned to
believe that life is priceless, may overcompensate for the loss, a
fixed-amount approach seems preferable.
On balance, the proposed minimum recovery statute is the
most reasonable means of recognizing the value of human life in
tort actions. It promotes the rationales underlying awards for such
damages in a way that is not unduly oppressive to defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
No one would dispute that a human life has intrinsic value
apart from its economic productivity. Indeed, most people, if
asked to place a value on human life, would quickly answer that
it is priceless. Yet our tort system ignores this intrinsic value of
life in actions arising from wrongful death. Instead, we effectively
value human life by focusing upon the pecuniary value of the
contributions the deceased tort victim could have been expected
to make to his dependents during his life. In so doing, we dis-
criminate against children, elderly persons, emancipated adults
who have not yet acquired their own dependents, and entire class-
es of low- or no-wage earners. The societal implications of this are
tremendous. Under the pecuniary loss rule, the lives of blacks and
women are worth less than those of white males, because, as class-
es, blacks and women earn less than white males.
The thesis of this Article has been that life has intrinsic value
that should be recognized in tort law. The arguments against
awarding such damages are twofold: (1) they fail to fulfill the
compensatory function of tort law, and (2) they are too specula-
tive. But, as demonstrated, these arguments paint with too broad
a brush, for they succeed only in calling into question a much
wider array of tort rules that allow recovery for other intangible
losses.
Awarding damages for the lost value of life in wrongful death
actions has two justifications. First, such damages serve to fulfill
the deterrent function of tort law. Optimalization of tortiously
caused accidents can be achieved only if the tort system takes full
account of all injuries caused by a tortfeasor. To the extent a
tortfeasor is not required to bear the full costs of his unsafe con-
248 See Smith, supra note 63, at 773 ("If injurers are liable for eis than actual costs,
their incentive to adopt safety measures is insuffident; if they are liable for more than
the actual costs of injuries, they overinvest in safety.").
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duct, he is insufficiently motivated to invest in safer behavior.
Loss of life is a very real cost which is currently excluded from
the deterrence calculus.
The second justification for lost-life damages-symbolic jus-
tice-transcends the traditional theories underlying tort law. Life
is the premier entitlement in a system of rights based upon per-
sonal security and autonomy. Without it, other entitlements mean
,nothing. Yet we operate under a system that gives no formal
recognition to the value of life, while effectively treating some
lives as worth more than others. As a symbolic reflection of
society's commitment to life, the tort system should recognize that
all lives have substantial value.
Thus far, lost-life damages have obtained their strongest foot-
hold in federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Several
federal courts have recognized damages for the lost value of life
in section 1983 wrongful death cases based upon the need to
deter unconstitutional deprivations of life. Among state courts,
only Connecticut has recognized a general right to recover for the
lost value of life in a death action. Under existing state remedies,
the most likely opportunities for persuading courts to recognize
lost-life damages exist in those states that measure damages in
wrongful death actions by the loss to the estate, rather than by
the loss to the survivors. In loss-to-the-estate jurisdictions, it is
logically and doctrinally consistent to include the intrinsic value of
the decedent's life as one of his estate's recoverable losses.
It is more difficult to reconcile recovery for lost-life damages
in the majority of states which measure wrongful death damages
by the loss to the survivors. The language of the wrongful death
statutes of some states precludes such damages, but the statutes
of many'states are amenable to a construction allowing recovery
for the value of lost life. In all states, however, a conceptual ob-
stacle stands in the way of recovering lost-life damages in wrong-
ful death actions. As opposed to the pecuniary losses, loss of
society, or mental anguish resulting from death, the intrinsic value
of the decedent's life is not a loss suffered by the survivors. Thus,
a formalistic argument exists that the survivors should not be
awarded damages for this injury which they have not experienced.
However, this should not prevent courts from correcting the
injustice of current damage rules in wrongful death cases, particu-
larly since, in practice, judges and juries currently strain to find
ways to grant just awards despite the rules. In the past, courts
have demonstrated a willingness to hurdle conceptual obstacles in
tort cases and refuse to be straitjacketed by precedent in order
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to do the right thing. If we are to recognize damages for lost life,
someone must recover them, and the survivors are logical recipi-
ents. Mechanically, it may be more appropriate for lost-life damag-
es to be recovered by the decedent's estate, but to make this
technical distinction outcome-determinative would exalt form over
substance. Substantively, courts should be willing to reinterpret
wrongful death statutes where the language so permits to allow
damages for the value of lost life.
The issue of how much a life is worth is a vexing one. Econ-
omists rely principally upon the "willingness-to-pay" method to
determine the value of life. That method looks alternatively at
what people demand to be paid in order to be exposed to an
increased risk of death and what they are willing to pay to avoid
being exposed to a risk of death. The willingness-to-pay method is
defective because it wrongly assumes that people exercise free
choice with respect to exposure to risks, and that they decide to
be exposed to a risk with full appreciation of the nature and
extent of the risk. Moreover, the human life values established by
economists in willingness-to-pay studies vary so widely that they
are of little worth to fact finders in wrongful death litigation.
Accepting both that life has intrinsic value that should be
recognized in tort actions and that there is no meaningful way to
compute that value, the author asserts that a solution can be
found in the English experience. English courts long recognized
recovery for what they called the "lost expectation of life" in a
fixed, arbitrary amount. The simplest way for states to recognize
lost-life damages would be to adopt legislation providing for a
fixed, minimum recovery in all wrongful death actions in which
the plaintiff is the prevailing party. This would not reflect a soci-
etal determination that life is worth only the minimum amount
the statute provides; rather, it would simply recognize that, to
further both the deterrent function of tort law and symbolic jus-
tice, a certain and severe sanction should be imposed whenever
one wrongfully takes a life.
For those who are not convinced by this case for hedonic
damages, the author poses a parting challenge-to defend the
status quo in the context of the following hypothetical. A drunk
driver runs a red light. His automobile collides with a Mercedes
Benz driven by a wealthy lawyer in his mid-thirties. In the auto-
mobile with the lawyer are his maid, whom he is driving home to
her family, and his two-year-old daughter. The lawyer, the maid
and the child are all killed. All three of these victims were happy,
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vibrant people with a fervent zest for living.
Yet, as a formal matter in the ensuing wrongful death ac-
tions, the smashed Mercedes will be treated as worth more than
the lives of all three tort victims since the law recognizes no inde-
pendent value for lost life. Indeed, one tail light of the automo-
bile is technically worth more than the lives of the lawyer, his
maid and his child. To the extent the law recognizes, in the form
of the pecuniary loss rule, that life is valuable to others, it would
treat the lawyer's life as being worth x times that of the maid and
the maid's life as being worth y times that of the child's.
How can this result be defended in a system which purports
to be built upon equality and justice? The joy of life-what makes
it worth living-is not the earning of money to give to others.
The pleasure of living lies in the thrills and exhilaration of a first
date, a first love, getting a driver's license, graduating from high
school and other rites of passage. It lies in the ups and downs of
marriage, family and career. It lies in the ordinary day: waking up
on a fresh, clear morning; drinking a cup of hot coffee and read-
ing a favorite newspaper section; dressing a child in mismatched
clothes that she insists on wearing and sending her off to school;
walking to the bus stop or subway in the brisk air; accomplishing
a job well done at work; listening to the soothing jabber of din-
ner-table talk with family; telling a bedtime story to a sleepy little
girl; turning the pages of a good mystery that you cannot put
down; and finally, enjoying the feel of cool sheets and warm blan-
kets in the peace and solitude of darkness, while mulling over the
day's events and contemplating the morrow. This is life. This is
what we live for. This is what is valuable.
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